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Abstract 
This thesis examines narratives about Ethiopia's former Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. In the 
aftermath of his death the narrative about his person and leadership has been presented in a 
certain way in public space. Hence this thesis asks how the narrative is constructed, how it has a 
strategic political function and how the cultivation of a cult of personality works as a mechanism 
of control. Analysis and discussion centre around three key themes of the official discourse about 
the former leader; Meles as developer, patriot and person. It combines contemporary propaganda; 
pictures of political posters and billboards from public space with narratives about the former 
leader based on qualitative interviews and conversations.  
The thesis concludes that the cult and its symbolism is first and foremost an effective way for the 
leadership to visualise its dominance on society. The cult is not static, but adaptable and flexible. 
A cult works to create a point of reference for the whole belief system of a regime centred on one 
man and today national days, traditions and success stories in society are connected directly to 
the former leader. For more than two decades Meles Zenawi was the driving force behind politics 
in Ethiopia and during his rule power became increasingly personalised. Although the idolisation 
of his personality emerged before he died, Meles explicitly embodies state, nation, party and 
ideology post mortem. The cultivating of a cult facilitates authoritarian rule and allows the 
leadership to continue with their rule.  
Comparing Meles Zenawi with the two former rulers in Ethiopia; Emperor Haile Selassie and 
military-leader Mengistu Haile Mariam reveals that current rule is following some of the same 
practises and linking rule to some of the same fundamental pillars that former regimes have relied 
upon. Finally, the official narrative about Meles Zenawi and the propaganda in public space also 
incorporates and relates to international discourses and international expectations.  
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Introduction                                                                                    
Meles Zenawi came to power in 1991 and ruled Ethiopia with an iron fist for over two decades. 
He died in August 2012 leaving the country with the design of a system centred on him and the 
ruling elite in terms of political power, economy and social control.  
 
After his death a state of national mourning was declared and mourning ceremonies and mass 
rallies took place. Thousands of people attended his funeral ceremony and accompanied his flag 
draped coffin on the way to the Holy Trinity Cathedral, next to the Ethiopian Parliament, for the 
burial. The funeral ceremony was broadcasted live and huge screens were put up in smaller 
villages around the country. On state television citizens cried publicly, mourning the loss and 
expressing their feelings towards their former leader. 
 
Ever since the death of the long serving prime minister public space has been dominated by his 
presence. On major billboards throughout the country Meles is celebrated as Ethiopia's 'great and 
visionary leader', 'father of peace', 'freedom fighter', 'hero' or as 'the architect of the renaissance'.  
 
Meskel Square, Addis Ababa, November 2012 
 
Books with his thoughts and speeches are sold in shops and street markets along with t-shirts, 
bags, poetry books, stickers, postcards, key rings and other items with his image on them.  
Wallpapers with the image of Meles Zenawi cover almost all government related buildings; from 
ministries to Kebele administrations and his image decorates the hallways inside state television 
and regional/local media agencies. Pictures of the former leader are also often found on private 
buildings and on windows of private vehicles and taxis.  
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On television and in newspapers Meles Zenawi is portrayed as an outstanding leader in all 
matters. He was the one who knew the path for Ethiopia and along with other statements urging 
people to unite around his memory it is stressed again and again that the people are committed to 
follow his path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
'We follow your path to achieve your goals and visions'  
 Stadium, Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
To commemorate the former leader a marble mausoleum is constructed at the Holy Trinity 
Cathedral and shortly after his death an outdoor exhibition about his life was established in the 
capital. The government has set up a website about him and established the 'Meles Foundation' in 
order to facilitate and promote education and research that follow the ideas of Meles.  
 
The death of the Ethiopian Prime Minister was not only mourned in Ethiopia. Foreign leaders 
have publicly mourned the loss of a diplomatically skilled African icon -  an ally of the west in 
the complicated region of the Horn of Africa. Before as well as after his death Meles Zenawi won 
praise for his leadership from top political actors. Former president Bill Clinton stated that Meles 
Zenawi was part of the new generation of African leaders dubbed as the 'African Renaissance' 
and Tony Blair invited Meles to join the Commission for Africa (Al Jazeera, 21 August, 2012).  
After Meles death UN secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said that Meles Zenawi 'would be 
remembered for his exceptional leadership and advocacy on African issues' (BBC,21 
August,2012). According to President Obama Meles deserved 'recognition for his lifelong 
contribution to Ethiopia's development.' British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed that 
Meles 'provided leadership and vision on Somalia and Sudan' and US Ambassador to the UN, 
Susan Rice, gave an emotional speech at the funeral ceremony calling Meles a true friend, 'a son 
of Ethiopia and a father to its rebirth' (Al Jazeera, 22 August, 2012). 
8 
Objective 
This report outlines one aspect of how to understand mechanisms in an authoritarian state. It 
focuses on the most dominant personality in Ethiopian politics, Meles Zenawi, who even in death 
is the country’s most visible personality. In his aftermath the narrative of his leadership and 
personality has been constructed and presented in a certain way. As authoritarian survival 
depends on how ruling elites can manage discourses the narrative of the leader is important.  
 
In a state like Ethiopia it is difficult to get access to the relevant power elite, but the way in which 
the regime performs in terms of propaganda and political symbolism is demonstrative. By 
analysing the propaganda, the symbols and the rhetoric in public space and through narratives 
presented to me by informants during my field work, it becomes possible to understand how the 
ruling elite wishes to frame the former leader and thereby also framing current rule. 
 
In an authoritarian context initiatives are rarely matters of coincidence, ideology or political 
ambition. Rather everything a regime does has to do with its survival. With this in mind the 
narrative is everything but 'change' or 'reality'; it has a strategic function with the state controlling 
how the former leader should be remembered and worshipped for a political reason. 
 
The intent is not to write a biography of the former Prime Minister, but rather the report aims to 
deconstruct the dominating narrative of his leadership and legacy. It focuses on aspects of the 
narrative that are politically important and that tell us something about how an authoritarian one-
party state claims and exercises power and about the pillars which this regime rests upon.   
 
Although the current regime distances itself from previous repressive systems and ruling patterns 
in Ethiopia, imperial rule and military rule, it appears that the current government is following 
some of the same patterns and linking rule to the same fundamental pillars that former regimes 
have relied upon. Therefore this thesis also includes a comparative aspect, comparing Meles 
Zenawi with the two former leaders of Ethiopia; Emperor Haile Selassie and military-leader 
Mengistu Haile Mariam. 
 
Question  
How is the narrative about Meles Zenawi constructed and how is the narrative used as a tool to 
create political legitimacy and control? 
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Structure of the report 
The report begins with a review of Ethiopia's political history since 1991. This is followed by a 
chapter framing Ethiopia within the context of authoritarianism focusing on personalised rule and 
personality cults.  
Chapter 3 concerns the methodology and focuses on key informants. The chapter outlines the 
informant groups and their social context, thereby providing background information about the 
different attitudes towards the former prime minister. 
Chapter 4 maps the government's channels of communication and presents the official narrative 
of the former prime minister as he has been portrayed since his death in August 2012. 
 
The analysis centres around three themes related to the official framing of the former leader; 
Meles -the Developer, Meles – the Patriot and Meles – the Person. All three chapters present two 
different narratives; one that partly overlaps the official narrative and one that stands in contrast 
to the government promoted narrative. Furthermore, all three chapters tell us something about 
how the regime holds and exercises power and how the cult of personality is established.  
 
Chapter 5, 'Meles - the Developer', concerns the framing of the former leader as an icon of 
development linked to the political discourse of the regime; developmentalism. Besides exploring 
narratives about Meles as a developer this chapter discusses the concept of 'development' and its 
opposite 'underdevelopment'. Furthermore, it compares the development project propagated by 
Meles Zenawi to the modernisation ambitions of the previous rulers; Haile Selassie and 
Mengistu. 
 
Chapter 6, 'Meles – the Patriot' deals with contemporary national symbolism. Although this 
regime rely upon a decentralised ethnic-based system it increasingly adheres to a pan-national 
discourse that includes a certain narrative about the past. This chapter also presents counter-
narratives and lastly the chapter places the rule of Meles Zenawi in a historical context. 
 
In public space Meles Zenawi is not only presented as a Great Leader, a moderniser, and a 
national hero he is also lauded for his outstanding personal qualities. Chapter 7, 'Meles – the 
Person', concerns this aspect of the narrative, and explores how the image of the former prime 
minister is made exceptional and how the cult aims to make all groups of society able to identify 
themselves with the leader. Additionally, this chapter presents counter-narratives and compares 
the framing of Meles Zenawi in public space to the framing of Mengistu and Haile Selassie.  
 
The last chapter summarises and concludes the paper. 
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1. Ethiopia since 1991                                  
This chapter outlines key political and historical events in Ethiopia since Meles Zenawi came to 
power in 1991 until the aftermath of his death in 2012.  
 
During the period from 1974 to 1991 Ethiopia was ruled by a military committee (the Derg) led 
by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. Meles Zenawi's rise to power began during the armed 
struggle against this system, when he became a key personality in the leadership of the TPLF 
(Tigray Peoples Liberation Front) a Marxist separatist movement from the Tigray region in the 
north of Ethiopia. The military regime was repressive and it was responsible for the deaths of 
millions because of failed economic policies. It became known for its violent crackdown on 
opponents during the Red Terror (ICG, 2009:3). In the countryside the TPLF mobilized the 
peasantry against the Derg who became its core base of support. Their mobilization approach 
reflected a Marxist-Leninist and Maoist attitude in terms of organising party, administration and 
propaganda (Young, 1997:33; Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003:15).  
 
Despite several attempts to fight the separatist movements in the north, the Derg was defeated by 
the revolutionary forces and Mengistu was forced into exile in 1991. TPLF (and the EPLF, 
Eritrean People's Liberation Front, who fought for Eritrean independence) captured the capital 
with international support from Arab and Western actors fighting against the Soviet in a cold war 
perspective (Zewde, 2002:256). Until takeover in 1991 the TPLF had sworn to Marxism, but 
when coming to power they took an anti-Soviet stand and changed its rhetoric to democracy, 
development and human rights appropriate for a Western alliance (Donham, 1999:182; Zewde, 
2002:261).  
 
From 1989 Meles Zenawi led both the TPLF and the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front) a coalition of various ethno-national fronts shaped to rule after the Derg. 
Besides the TPLF, representing a relatively small ethnic group (about 6% of the population), the 
EPRDF coalition includes the EPDM (Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement)1 the OPDO 
(Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation) and SEPDF (Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic 
Front) (ICG, 2009:4). 
EPRDF is organized similarly to a Marxist-Leninist model led by a central committee and the 
structure is passed on hierarchically down through a system of cadres within the framework of 
the federalist system (Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003:16).  
 
In the initial phase the EPRDF seemingly acknowledged the participation of other parties except 
from pan-national parties accused of being loyal to the old system. In collaboration with other 
parties the EPRDF established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), with Meles 
                                                 
1
 The precursor to the ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement) 
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Zenawi as president. Soon, however, it became clear to other parties that the EPRDF, dominated 
by the TPLF, had already prepared and decided the political landscape of the future and parties 
withdrew from the TGE (ICG, 2009:4). One-party dynamics in the new state could from the onset 
be traced (Young, 1997:206). 
 
The TPLF dominated the ruling coalition of the EPRDF that was formed to give the TPLF a 
wider political scope in Ethiopia, but who in reality implemented and institutionalised the policy 
of the TPLF (Lefort, 2012b; Tadesse&Young, 2003). The nature of decision making within the 
EPRDF and in the TPLF relates to the principle of democratic centralism. In principle this allows 
members of some degree of discussion until a decision is made and all members are expected to 
follow suit. However, in reality this reflects a top-down approach to decision-making 
(Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003:119). In promoting individual loyalty to the collective this 
organisational principle affects not only the internal mechanisms of TPLF and the EPRDF, it 
promotes a model where the leadership understands itself as best able to secure the needs of both 
party and population and it has formed a centralised leadership lacking transparency and 
pluralism (Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003:147; ICG, 2012:3).  
 
The TPLF saw the question of nationalities (ethnicities) as the root cause of Ethiopia’s political 
and economic problems that had marked the country before 1991 (Hagmann&Abbink, 2011). 
Distancing itself from decades of repressive rule the new state discourse was to move away from 
a central dominated bureaucratic system (Shoan Amhara dominated) that had characterized the 
governments of previous regimes led by Emperor Haile Selassie and the military-government of 
Mengistu. Instead a decentralised administration was established in order to create a 
representative state for the various groups (Young, 2006:197). Drawing on a Stalinist approach to 
the national question the new constitution allowed the Nation, Nationalities and People of 
Ethiopia their right to self-determination. This transformed Ethiopia to a federal state dividing the 
country into nine ethnically based regions; Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Somali, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Southern Nations, Gambella and Harar (ICG, 2009:5).  
 
The decentralised system divides Ethiopia into regions, districts, woredas and kebeles officially 
to promote self-government in accordance with the constitution. This is however contradicted by 
the centralised party structure that maintains control of the regional and the woreda and kebele 
level. The regional states have from the beginning been weak and dominated by the central 
government and the ruling party (ICG, 2009). The woreda and kebele system was inherited from 
the Derg, who established it in order to communicate its policy, ideology and development plans 
to the lowest levels of the state, while it also served as a mechanism for the regime to control 
opponents (Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003).  
 
The new constitution was implemented in 1995 and later that year Meles Zenawi was elected the 
executive prime minister of Ethiopia. At the second federal and regional election in 2000 Meles 
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Zenawi was again elected as prime minister and Girma Wolde-Giogis as president. Both elections 
were dominated by the ruling party, while opposition parties claimed uneven competition and 
harassments (HRW, 2010:11).  
 
In 1998 Ethiopian-Eritrean border disputes turned into armed clashes and later into a full-scale 
war. The war with Eritrea from 1998-2000 led to pivotal changes within the TPLF leadership 
when a power struggle came to light over the conduct of the war. Meles Zenawi was challenged 
by his colleagues in this process, yet he was able to eliminate his opponents within the party. He 
succeeded removing the 'old guard', the remaining influential characters within the TPLF and 
instead he promoted new loyal supporters obedient to him, including his wife Azeb Mesfin 
(Lefort, 2012b). The outcome of the process was a shift in power from Tigray to the central 
government in Addis Ababa, from the party to the state and from several TPLF key actors to 
Meles Zenawi himself. From this point rule became more and more personalized (Lefort, 2012b 
and Tadesse, 2012:2).  
In the aftermath of the TPLF-split a renewal-process (tehadso) was initiated as a process of re-
ideologisation and internal party renewal, but also as an initiative to integrate the Ethiopian 
economy into the global economy (Tadesse&Young, 2003; Tronvoll, 2012).  
 
The federal and regional election in 2005 represents a crossroad in the political history of 
Ethiopia. The run up was a limited but historic political opening, where a degree of public debate 
was allowed and coalitions of opposition parties were able to emerge and challenge the ruling 
party (Aalen&Tronvoll, 2008:112). However, when the preliminary results indicated a victory to 
the opposition the election was manipulated in favour of the government. On May 16 the 
Minister of Information and EPRDF campaign manager, Bereket Simon, declared the ruling party 
had won the majority of the parliamentary seats and prime minister Meles Zenawi imposed a 
month-long ban on public demonstrations in the capital (HRW, 2010:13). The allegations of fraud 
that had brought victory to the EPRDF resulted in a period of widespread protests and 
demonstrations turned bloody when authorities killed nearly 200 people. In the post-election 
period thousands of protesters, opposition leaders, civil society leaders and journalists were 
detained. Many of these faced hard sentences, but were later released potentially also affected by 
a degree of international pressure (Tronvoll, 2012).  
The government faced international criticism upon the election, but prime minister Meles Zenawi 
rejected dialogue about this issue. Depending on the audience he would explain the democratic 
deficit in his country from different angles for instance by claiming that democracy should not be 
imposed by outsiders or by proclaiming that Ethiopia was indeed moving towards democracy 
albeit slowly given the many challenges it faced in a long-term development process (Tronvoll, 
2012:284). 
 
After the 2005 election the Ethiopian government rolled back the process of democratic progress 
and continued the trend of repression. The post-election period showed that the brief democratic 
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experience before the election was more like an unusual break and re-establishing control the 
government developed a complex strategy of new legislation and policies aimed at controlling 
civil society, media and opposition (Aalen&Tronvoll, 2009). The election had terrified the ruling 
party as they realised the lack of public support. They were not regarded as legitimate and they 
had little support in urban areas and especially among the youth (Aalen&Tronvoll, 2008:115).  
 
Besides the new measures of control and mobilization, presented by the ruling elite as capacity 
building or strategies of decentralisation, Meles Zenawi changed his rhetoric from a focus on 
democracy to development. The ideology of the party 'revolutionary democracy' which is 
originally rooted in Marxist-Leninist philosophy has continued to evolve and after the 2005 
election it aimed first and foremost at development (Hagmann, 2012:2).   
 
With developmentalism as the new state ideology the government emphasised economic growth, 
MDG's and the motto of Meles Zenawi became 'poverty is our enemy' portraying poverty as the 
fundamental threat to the country (Kefale, 2011:3). Comprehensive development plans were 
initiated aiming at infrastructure/construction, housing, health, agriculture/rural development, 
poverty reduction and prevention of unemployment through micro and small scale enterprises.  
In 2010 the government announced the ambitious five year Growth and Transformation Plan with 
the aim of making Ethiopia into a middle-income country by 2020-2023 (GTP, 2010:21).  
In an international context Ethiopia has expanded its ties to Western donors and in general to the 
international community in terms of aid and diplomacy turning Ethiopia into one of the world 
largest recipients of aid. During the development paradigm the country has not only expanded its 
ties to western actors and donors it has also established and expanded close ties to China.  
 
Meles Zenawi won international respect by opposing market fundamentalism and neoliberal 
models of development. Instead he spoke for a strong state admiring the rapid industrialization 
processes in parts of Asia convinced that the role of the state in a developmental phase should 
remain strong. Although the leadership rejected Marxism around 1991 and have since then 
advocated capitalism the economy has not been liberalised and the leadership continues to regard 
itself as the best able to secure the economic transformation (Vaughan&Gebremichael, 2011:31).  
 
After 9/11 Ethiopia allowed US military stations in the country and Ethiopia's engagement and 
efforts in Somalia have been highly appreciated by the international community. In 2006 
Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia fighting the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who had taken control 
of large parts of the country and who according to Meles Zenawi was a threat to his country that 
had to be neutralized. In support of Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, US warplanes carried out 
attacks from a base in Ethiopia and in 2011 US military began flying drone aircrafts from a base 
in the country (Al Jazeera, 29 October 2011).  
 
The system of ethnic federalism has led to new conflicts over borders and access to resources 
(Hagmann&Abbink, 2012:584). Since 1991 conflicts deriving from the ethnic system have 
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increased and it is estimated that several thousand people lost their lives related to ethnic conflicts 
between 1991 and 2005 (ICG, 2009:25).  
The post-1991 government has a direct or indirect share in ethnic clashes and is furthermore 
responsible for the army's methods of collective punishment, torture, murder and rape in the 
western region Gambella and in Somali region where the regime attempts to maintain control by 
cracking down on opposers (ICG, 2009). 
 
The government has faced hard criticism for its large scale land-leasing policies leasing land to 
companies in for example Saudi Arabia forcing thousands of Ethiopians to leave their land. 
According to the Growth and Transformation Plan the foreign investments would reduce poverty 
and improve agricultural expertise (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012b).  
Huge hydropower projects expected to provide Ethiopia with sufficient energy and in the long 
run promote food security have also been at the core of the development agenda. These projects 
are, however, also criticised of threatening livelihoods of thousands of people in the rural areas 
(ibid.). In the beginning of 2011 Meles Zenawi announced the largest power project so far, the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The dam will be constructed on the Nile River about 40 km. 
from the Sudanese border in Western Ethiopia and is supposed to be the largest hydro-power 
plant in Africa. Ethiopia intends to export power to the neighbouring countries. 
 
Elections since 2005 have generally been dubbed fake. At the 2008 local election and at the 2010 
general election opposition candidates were regularly assaulted during strategies of intimidation 
and harassment. At the 2010 election only two seats did not go the EPRDF in the parliament 
(HRW, 2010; ICG, 2012).  
Since 2009 the government has adopted two new laws that have had significant impact on civil 
society and political freedom. The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation introduced in 2009 is a tool to 
imprison opponents and critical journalists. For example in 2012 following months of public 
protests from the Muslim community opposing government interference in religious affairs the 
anti-terror law have been an effective tool to imprison demonstrators (HRW, 2013). A civil 
society law, regarded as one of the most restrictive of its kind, is preventing foreign funding to 
local organisations and complicates independent human rights work (Tronvoll, 2012:275). 
 
In August 2012 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died after months of rumours about his declining 
health. His successor is former Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. The transition was 
recently completed when the EPRDF re-elected the new prime minister as chairman of the 
coalition in March 2013. 
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2. Understanding authoritarian regimes                   
This chapter examines the concepts of authoritarianism and personalised rule. The first section 
focuses on common trends in non-democratic rule while the second section explores the concept 
of personality cults and personalised rule. This is followed by a section on the connection 
between symbolism and nation-building in authoritarian context. Lastly, the issue of leadership 
succession is discussed.   
2.1 Keeping power: tools and techniques  
After the fall of the iron curtain political thought was dominated by the view that democratisation 
is inevitable because democracy is the best and most advanced form of government. However, 
many states in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia have taken a slightly different path than 
expected from the 'inevitable model'. 'Hybrid regimes' are able to combine authoritarianism with 
a democratic facade without a transition to democracy, rather a transition away from democracy. 
Reforms, sometimes lacking any kind of political substance, are mainly a tool to strengthen the 
grip on society (Carothers,2002). Breaking from the 'transitology' paradigm which emphasised 
democratisation, focus was now directed at 'authoritarian resilience' explaining instead the 
'success of authoritarianism' and the ability of these systems to survive (Albrecht &Schlumberger, 
2004).  
 
Serving the purpose of regime maintenance authoritarian rulers have a wide range of tools and 
techniques at hand. First and foremost the use of force; imprisonment and direct physical 
violence against opponents and by forcing opponents into exile. Secondly, regimes can restrict 
political competition for example by law, by manipulating elections and by controlling press and 
media to ensure complete dominance of public space preventing alternative discourses from 
gaining ground. Thirdly, rulers use methods of co-optation on different levels; of elites or other 
relevant groups of society or by co-opting oppositional discourses and policies. Lastly, by 
responding strategically to international circumstances or paradigms (Albrecht&Schlumberger, 
2004:376; Matveeva, 2009).  
 
Although authoritarian rule can be highly personalised with a dominant leader personifying the 
state, authoritarian systems can at the same time be highly institutionalised (Slater, 2003:82). 
Institutions supply regimes with infrastructure that is needed to implement its power and 
autocrats rely on the infrastructure to co-opt groups within society in order to neutralise threats. 
Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) points out that the more institutionalised a system is the more 
resistant it will be (Gandhi& Przeworski, 2007:1280).  
In terms of providing institutional infrastructure one-party states are unique in the degree to 
which a regime can extend its power and infiltrate society by absorbing a variety of civil society 
organisations for example women's organisations, youth- or sports organisations (Gandhi& 
Przeworski, 2007:1292; Slater, 2003). 
16 
With the ability of co-optation and 'changing for stability' authoritarian rule is far from static but 
highly flexible. Nondemocratic rule is thus not premodern to democracy as understood in a 
modernisation type of analysis (Albrecht&Schlumberger, 2004:386). Authoritarian rule is flexible 
and modern illustrated by recent trends of increasing interaction between regimes worldwide, 
dubbed 'authoritarian internationalism'. Rulers tend to export and collaborate about methods of 
control and repression and additionally initiate new platforms or counter-organizations in order to 
challenge Western dominated institutions (Calingaert, 2013).  
 
Although strategies of co-optation and 'changing for stability' gives the impression that regimes 
are extremely robust entities designed to continue forever, because they are able to adapt to new 
circumstances evidence from the Arab world since 2011 (and other uprisings in history) have 
proven that attempts to control populations can be challenged (Cavatorta&Haugbølle, 2012; 
Tronvoll, 2012). As autocrats never asked their people, they do not know their populations very 
well which makes it easier for them to either underestimate or exaggerate approaching crisis' or 
threats (Matveeva, 2009:1096).  
 
In order not to rely completely on coercion and physical power autocrats try to frame their rule in 
a way that makes it acceptable. For the purpose of generating some kind of legitimacy 
propaganda and symbolic language are important features (Koch, 2013; Matveeva, 2009; 
Wedeen, 1999). In the absence of democracy rule has to be presented as being effective in other 
areas for example in providing development and security. 'Developmental regimes' frame their 
rule as being progress-oriented and successful playing on 'positive strategies'. Rule is presented as 
being able to overcome backwardness bringing growth and modernity (Koch,2013:44).   
 
Autocrats pay attention to global paradigms such as capitalism and democracy and are formally 
pursuing policies that suits these international expectations. To an international audience 
autocrats present themselves as liberal modernisers slowly preparing their society to a more 
democratic political system (Albrecht&Schlumberger, 2004:376).  
Not only have autocrats learned to adapt to paradigms of capitalism and democracy; regimes 
have also learned how to benefit from global ideological paradigms such as the 'war against 
terrorism' (Albrecht&Schlumberger, 2004:377). This makes it possible for despotic rulers to 
inflame fears and benefit from this with international support. During the last decade regimes 
from Russia, China, Central Asia to the Middle East and Africa have been able to suppress 
domestic oppositions in the name of counter-terrorism without raising serious concerns from the 
international community. In this regard the anti-terrorism era has made demands for domestic 
democratic progress into a secondary issue benefiting authoritarian rule (ibid.). 
 
Officially Ethiopia is a federal democratic republic with a ruling party committed to a multiparty 
democratic system, to a system of ethnic federalism that decentralises power and to an ideology 
of revolutionary democracy aiming at democratisation and development.  
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However, the difference between principle and practise is significant and especially since 2005 
the regime has stepped up authoritarian measures. First by cracking down on opposition actors 
using force and violence, secondly by criminalising or de-legitimising opposition parties 
(Aalen&Tronvoll, 2009; Tronvoll, 2012).  
The government has increasingly imposed new laws to restrict political competition and to 
control public space. The anti-terror law is serving as a tool to imprison political opponents, 
undermine freedom of speech and inspiring fear of political engagement within the population 
(Tronvoll, 2012). Ethiopia has developed into an authoritarian one-party state and the party-state 
apparatus is expanded to the most local level in order to control and co-opt local elites 
(Tronvoll,2012). Especially after the 2005 election, mass-recruitment campaigns have turned the 
EPRDF into a mass-party and in exchange for loyalty individuals are rewarded for instance with 
promotion or material goods (Aalen&Tronvoll, 2008:115). The party is predominant; for example 
membership is a precondition for a career in the public sector or a precondition to join the MSE 
projects.  
 
Formally, state and party are divided, yet the public administration and the party system are 
overlapping and connected (Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003:135). This undermines the idea of neutral 
government offices and the kebele structure becomes an effective instrument of control. The 
ruling party make use of the structure to co-opt groups in order to widen its power base and 
through the federalist system it is able to control all political processes (ICG, 2009; HRW, 
2010:15).  
 
The government does not only control most of the media and the use of the media, it has also 
developed its own media platforms to support its agenda within the framework of the federalist 
system. The government and the EPRDF have established Woredanet and Schoolnet, two systems 
that use satellite communication to connect the centre to the periphery (Gagliardone, 2013; 
Gagliardone, 2011a).Through Woredanet ministries and cadres can videoconference with regional 
and woreda offices allowing the government to reach all parts of the country and deliver 
messages, instructions and political ideas to the lowest levels of government (ibid.).  
Broadcasting to the school system Schoolnet uses a similar architecture as Woredanet. Pre-
recorded lessons are provided throughout the country from 16.686 plasma TV screens in 775 
secondary schools in a variety of subjects such as mathematics and history. The official aim of 
Schoolnet is to give all students access to the same quality of education in order to even out 
differences between the region. However, both systems, Woredanet and Schoolnet, allows the 
ruling party to instruct the lower levels of the state (ibid.). 
 
Among 'failed' and 'terrorist states' in the region Meles Zenawi was able to present Ethiopia as a 
Christian and stabile island and as an ally of the West in the global war on terrorism building up 
his international legitimacy (Mohammed, 2012). The government benefits from the war on 
terrorism exemplified by the implementation of the anti-terror law and the Ethiopian invasion of 
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Somalia. However, Ethiopia and Somalia have a background of ongoing border disputes that 
makes it impossible to detach recent wars from the history of territorial struggles between the two 
countries. 
 
2.2 Personality cults 
A cult of personality is more than a marginal aspect of authoritarian rule and not to be simplified 
as an absurd or bizarre phenomenon in a totalitarian context (Wedeen, 1999:4). Throughout the 
world cults and their integrated systems of symbolism have played significant roles influencing 
societies politically, economically and culturally (Sassoon, 2012).  
The main purpose of establishing a personality cult is to construct a bond between leadership and 
society by using historical, traditional and often religious symbols to shape and maintain this 
relationship (Sassoon,2012). According to Rees (2004) 'a cult of personality is an established 
system of veneration of a political leader to which members of the society are expected to 
prescribe to a system that is omnipresent and ubiquitous and one that is expected to persist 
indefinitely. It is thus a deliberately constructed and managed mechanism, which aims at the 
integration of the political system around the leader’s persona' (Rees, 2004:8). 
 
Accordingly, cults are mainly fiction which are deliberately constructed and managed by ruling 
elites often in a systematic way (Strong&Killingsworth, 2011; Sassoon, 2011;175). A cult is 
promoted through media and propaganda but also art, songs, literature and poems are significant 
tools to present the heroic acts of the leadership in public space (Sassoon, 2012).  
In some states a cult is developed before a leader comes to power, in other cases during the rulers 
leadership and sometimes cults develop post mortem for example seen in the cases of the cults of 
Lenin or Atatürk.   
 
A leader cult reflects the condition of a political system in a given state. Firstly, it reveals to what 
extend power has been personified, secondly, it indicates how regulated political debate is, 
thirdly, it reflects to what extend the media and the press is controlled and fourthly, it indicates 
how much control a regime has on socialisation processes in society e.g. the educational system 
(Rees,2004:8). 
 
Known for developing exaggerated cults of personalities the political system in Soviet becomes 
relevant starting with the cult of Lenin. In every aspect of public life the communist propaganda 
presented the Soviet leaders as icons or 'larger-than-life heroes', who were personifications of the 
ideology and the state. In general a cult works to personify state and society and it becomes a 
state building function; leaders portray their states and they become their states (Stacher, 2011; 
Wedeen, 1999).  
Before his death Lenin built up his power base and rule was definitely personalised. However, the 
actual cult of his personality mainly developed after his death. There is no single explanation to 
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its rise but after his death it appeared that there was a need to mobilize the masses around a 
unifying symbol (Tucker, 1979:347). Despite the secularism in communism the cult incorporated 
elements of the Russian past deeply connected to Orthodox Christianity (ibid.) Furthermore, after 
Lenin's death the party was still affected by his legacy and it became an integrated part of the 
party's aim for legitimation. They needed his legacy to maintain rule. There was no direct 
individual successor after him so the party immortalized him and cultivated the cult, related also 
to a long tradition of personified power in Russia under the tsar (Tucker, 1973). 
 
Facilitated by the cult of Lenin, or by co-opting Lenin's cult, Stalin built his own cult presenting 
himself as 'the father of the nation' and the establishment of the Soviet Union was directly 
connected to Stalin's person (Gill, 1980). During Stalin's leadership all success stories in society 
were pictured as stemming directly from his wise decision-making; for example the success of 
industrialization (Gill, 1980). Obsessed with presenting themselves as leaders who embody the 
aspirations of their people several autocrats have propagated great modernisation projects in 
order to change the life of their populations. For example, Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt build the 
Aswan Dam on the Nile River and Muammar Qadaffi in Libya created an artificial river 
supposed to bring water and fortune to thousands of people. This framed them as outstanding 
leaders regarding every idea they had about the future (Sassoon, 2012). 
 
A major element in a cult is the relationship with the people. Stalin for example presented himself 
as truly devoted to his people, he cared for them and he knew what his people wanted. It was he 
who gave life to the Soviet people because he was the source of inspiration of his people 
(Gill,1980:170). Same patterns are seen in the cults of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Hafez al-
Assad in Syria (Sassoon, 2012; Wedeen, 1999).  
 
Characteristically, autocrats often officially diminish the cults. Stalin expressed that personalized 
power was against the official Soviet view on leadership rooted in the notion of collective 
leadership. The cult of personality negated the basic leadership principle in communist theory 
which made collective leadership more of a principle of symbolic importance in Soviet, rather 
than an actual practise (Strong&Killingsworth, 2011; Gill, 1980:176).  
In this regard it is also possible that a cult develops to become the actual core of a party's 
ideology (Sassoon, 2012). 
 
In general a cult is understood as a tool for a non-democratic leadership to legitimate their rule. 
The heavy symbolism aims to persuade people to identify with the leadership making the rule 
acceptable (Strong&Killingsworth, 2011; Sassoon, 2012; Gill, 1980).  
In her work on the cult of Hafez al-Assad in Syria Wedeen (1999) argues that the development of 
a cult has less to do with legitimacy and making people actually believe in the worshipping of a 
leader and more to do with forming discipline. She asks why a leadership would spend time, 
money and resources on building up a cult that few people or no one would actually believe in. 
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The cult is better understood as a mechanism of control because it has a strong disciplinary effect; 
it instructs people and sets guidelines for public speech and behaviour and it makes people 
control each other. By occupying public space and by claiming monopoly on rhetoric the cult is 
depoliticizing (Wedeen, 1999:43).  
Citizens will start promoting a cult because of the 'tipping effect'. If a person sees other people 
support the cult he/she fears the consequences of being the only one not supporting it. Thus 
people support the cult out of fear and because it is easier to obey than dealing with the potential 
consequences (Wedeen, 1999:152).  
Furthermore, in one-party states party structures are often a tool to promote the cults. Supporting 
and promoting a cult can thus be a way to improve one's social stand as rewards and resources are 
allocated down through the party system (Wedeen,1999; Sassoon, 2012).  
 
Finally, it is important to note that whatever the degree of a cult it rarely tells us anything about to 
what extent and how many people actually genuinely support the particular leader or system 
(Gill, 1980; Sassoon, 2012). But whether based on fear or some degree of genuine commitment a 
cult has consequences as it sets guidelines in public space and facilitates authoritarian rule 
(Sassoon, 2012).  
 
In Ethiopia leadership and rule have traditionally remained authoritarian and personalized, with a 
powerful man on top. Under imperial rule this was characterised as a tough-man system 
(Clapham, 1969:111). During the imperial period styles of leadership varied according to man 
and situation; however rule was always centralised and personalised (ibid.).  
Like the previous emperors, Haile Selassie (who ruled until 1974) drew on the symbols of God 
and the church. Rule was deeply attached to the Orthodox Christian Church with the integrated 
tradition of divine rule based on the connection to the line of Judah (Clapham, 1969:111; 
Sählström, 1990:11). Although Haile Selassie was a moderniser, his leadership was based on 
traditional forms. It combined the divine right to rule, in fact this was asserted in the constitution, 
with an intense personal grip on power (Clapham, 1967,119). Control was the essence of his 
style; he was strategic, manipulative and able to play rivals off against the other in order to ensure 
his absolute position at the top of the system (Clapham, 1967:116).  
 
The revolutionary military forces (the Derg) came to power promising to free the masses from the 
grasp of the old imperial regime (Zewde, 2002:262). The agenda of the Derg regime was closely 
inspired, attached and also supported by the Soviet system. However, when facing a crisis in the 
shape of the Somali invasion in 1977/78, Mengistu consolidated his role as a dictator and began 
to appropriate Orthodox Christian traditions and symbols (Donham, 1999:146). A cult of 
personality was developed referring to the past; for example the aspirations of the legendary 
emperor Tewodros served as a key point for the Derg (Sahlström, 1990:12).  
When building his cult Mengistu also received help from North Korean artists in producing art 
and propaganda (Sählström, 1990:127). 
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It is argued that the cult of Lenin was easy to cultivate in the Soviet because of the authoritarian 
legacy; tsar rule combined with Christianity (Tucker, 1979). Similar to Soviet the Orthodox 
Church had for centuries played a role in the Ethiopian state when military leader Mengistu took 
over. The era of imperial rule was completely dependent, protected and intertwined with the 
Orthodox Church. After the revolution the traditional system of personalised rule including the 
aspect of divine power was easily adaptable to the communist tradition also relying on absolute 
power (Donham, 1999:149). 
 
Meles Zenawi came to power with the Marxist-Leninist TPLF. In principle and in the beginning 
the TPLF was against personalisation of power favouring collective leadership according to the 
ideology (Young, 1997:12). They did not attempt to establish a personality cult and no visual 
images of leaders for the purpose of propaganda were aloud during the formation period. Power 
struggles within the movement were not absent, but initially it was a decision from the leadership 
not to allow any leader to dominate (Young,1997:143). However, although Meles Zenawi was not 
a particular populistic figure to begin with there was no doubt that he was in charge playing a role 
of primus inter pares (Lefort, 2012b; Hagmann, 2012).  
The actual process of power concentration began in 2001 when the split within the TPLF 
consolidated Meles' power (Tadesse, 2012). This process was further developed when the regime 
faced a popular opposition at the 2005 election. From that point the ruling elite shifted to an 
authoritarian populism and the elite, including the EPRDF, started to cultivate a cult of 
personality as one instrument in the strategy to sustain power (ICG, 2009). Meles as a leader, 
ideologist and person became more and more elevated from people, party and state and the 
propaganda cemented his role. Yet, visually in public space, the cult was at a modest level until 
after his death. 
 
2.3 State formation and national symbols  
Through the creation of symbols, national myths and 'spectacles' (e.g. festivals and mass 
demonstrations) authoritarian rule represents at one time it's dominance on the state while the 
symbols also operates as means of dominance (Wedeen, 1999:10). Therefore, besides facilitating 
authoritarian rule, a cult and its implicit 'truth production' facilitates a process of nation-building; 
it cultivates a sense of national membership generating a story of shared experience, identity and 
past (Wedeen, 1999:157). In other words, in order for the regime to hold its territory it produces a 
system of symbols exemplifying its dominance on the state and on national identity (Wedeen, 
1999:15). 
In authoritarian systems power is expressed through full control over official history and 
memories and also over the forms in which these memories are expressed (Jovic, 2011). There 
are official rituals and practices of respecting the symbols of official memories and it is the duty 
of the citizens to perform the rituals through which they demonstrate their respect. In respecting 
official ceremonies, celebrations, national symbols and national holidays what they are actually 
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demonstrating are the respect for those in power. To show disrespect of official memories is an 
act of rebellion (Jovic, 2011; Matveeva, 2009).  
 
It is common in revolutionary/authoritarian states to rely heavily on the departure of former 
oppressive rule. Rhetoric and symbols picture the past as a 'dark period' and the revolution is 
pictured as the starting point to a better era (Albrecht& Schlumberger, 2004). The past becomes a 
period of injustice, which is replaced by a new and different future (Jovic, 2011).  
By rejecting the past the new rule also needs to reinvent national identity and national traditions 
and for this purpose make use of parades, national day celebrations with the implicit political 
messages (Wedeen, 1999:13). 
 
2.4 Leadership succession 
A key challenge facing authoritarian systems is the issue of leadership succession. The death of 
an autocrat can produce different outcomes for example father to son succession as seen in North 
Korea, Azerbaijan, Syria, Jordan, Congo, Nicaragua and Haiti (Cantori, 2002; Stacher, 2011).  
 
In the Soviet Union leadership succession of Lenin, Stalin and the removal of Khrushchev were 
characterised by almost similar episodes. In the initial phase of succession collective leadership 
became a reality. But in each case this was followed by a situation where one man developed and 
achieved  more influence than the others (Gill, 1980). Therefore, in the system of power in the 
Soviet the function of the cult was to legitimate leadership succession. Furthermore, the implicit 
function of the cult, to enable people to rise in the hierarchy by promoting the cult, might have 
been the cult's actual fundament (Rees, 2004).  
 
In China succession has been handled by strategic collective leadership and the communist party 
has been opposing personalized rule after a period of personalised power under the rule of Mao 
Zedung and Deng Xiapeng. In today's authoritarian system a group of strongmen has power 
effectively running the country (Tatlow, New York Times, 2013). 
 
It is important to note that regardless of the degree of personalised rule autocrats do not rule 
alone, they have a power base surrounding their leadership (Stacher, 2011:202). At the point 
where the regime is most vulnerable, the point of leadership succession, the system's ability to 
continue depends on how well elites are able to co-operate. The elite and collective decision-
making are 'activated' and the successful cooperation within the elite depends on the already 
established institutions that are capable of organising the rule (Slater, 2003; Stacher, 2011:208). 
Although it might appear as a paradox when rule has been centralised and personified for a long 
period, power struggles within an elite do not necessarily arise in the absence of the strongman. 
Rather than starting a power struggle that could threaten a regime fundamentally, elites are more 
likely to compromise in order to sustain the system (Stacher, 2012). Furthermore, party-backed 
23 
regimes appear to be very effective in this process, because parties provide ideal arenas for 
decision-making (Slater, 2003).  
 
The death of Meles Zenawi ended a period where extreme concentration of power had lied in the 
hands of a single person. Nonetheless, Meles had a strong power base of loyalists who he had 
built up himself tactically promoting his own group of young technocrats from various regions of 
the country (Lefort, 2012c; Hagmann, 2012). The choice of Hailemariam Desalegn as prime 
minister and as chairman of the EPRDF suggests that a succession plan was already at hand when 
Meles died. Meles himself promoted Hailemariam Desalegn first by removing him from his 
presidency of the Southern Region to the centre of the state and later by promoting him as Deputy 
Prime Minister in 2010 (Davison, 2 October 2012). 
 
Before his death rumours about Meles' declining health and potential death had circulated. Meles 
was too ill to participate in an African Union summit and he did not make any public appearance. 
The government rejected all claims about the Prime Minister's declining health and insisted that 
he would soon return back to work. Most likely the public, or segments of the public, had realised 
that he was either already dead or about to die a long time before the actual announcing. In light 
of Ethiopia' history of revolutions and violent takeovers the succession process was expected to 
produce some degree of power struggle within the elite (Davison, 22 August 2012; Lefort, 
2012b). And given the nature of the system the absence of the strongman created a degree of 
anxiety and confusion domestically and internationally. However, the transition, seen from 
outside, went smoothly and the succession plan was followed. As all parts in the coalition need 
each other to stay in power and have an interest in maintaining the one-party system no dramatic 
struggle appeared (Hagmann, 2012).   
When Meles Zenawi was prime minister, Halemariam Desalegn was a low-profile deputy prime 
minister. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, a Protestant from the South, now has three 
Deputy Prime Ministers, from the other three parties of the coalition, a Tigray, an Amhara and an 
Oromo reflecting the attempt to present rule as both collective and inclusive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
3. Empirical data and methods of research                 
This chapter describes the methodology and discuss the background of the selection of 
informants. It presents general demographic characteristics of informant groups that help to 
explain how different groups in society perceive the former prime minister. 
 
3.1 Empirical data 
The report is based on 35 formal and informal interviews and conversations conducted during a 
period of five weeks from mid-November to mid December 2012 mainly in the capital, Addis 
Ababa, but also in Harar in Eastern Ethiopia. The fieldwork was conducted approximately three 
months after the death of the prime minister.  
 
The empirical data consists of visual material; pictures of political posters and billboards in 
public space as well as postcards and items with the image of the former prime minister. The 
photo documentation presented in the analysis was collected during the field work.   
 
Primary sources consist of leaflets; Hibre Biher Magazine, Memorial Issue for His Excellence 
Meles Zenawi (House of Federation, FDRE) handed out at the '7
th
 Ethiopian Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples Day celebration and a leaflet about Meles Zenawi and the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.  
Included are also policy papers and documents from Ethiopian Ministries, EPRDF and TPLF; 
Growth and Transformation Plan from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 
Portrait of Meles (EPRDF.com 2012), A Statement of Condolence Released from the Central 
Committee of the TPLF over the Sudden Bereavement of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (Central 
Committee of the TPLF August 21, 2012), Let Us Stand to Realize the Vision of Our Country 
Following the Foot Prints of Our Chairman (EPRDF, Message no. 6, 2012), Meles’ Portrait: 
Sketch of who He is (EPRDF.com) and In Memoriam Meles Zenawi (E.R.T.A).  
I made a review of 'Ethiopian Herald' issues from October to November 2012, and included are 
also references to news clips from ETV from Diretube.com. 
 
Lastly, the paper is based on observation. This includes observing how people relate to the 
images and billboards in public space, observing religious symbols/religion in society by visiting 
Churches and Mosques, how national festivals are celebrated (I attended the 7
th
 Nations, 
Nationalities and People's Day celebration in Harar), and how informants react and respond when 
being presented with my topic about their former leader. 
 
The political situation in Ethiopia influences the way data is gathered and the premises of 
conducting interviews. The potential discomfort for some informants when talking about political 
topics in general and especially with a foreigner had an impact on the interviews.  
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Regardless of which way the topic was presented I asked my informants to tell me about their 
former leader and his legacy.     
 
3.2 Informants  
Informants consist of mainly three groups; Civil servants/government officials, businessmen/ 
women and intellectuals. In general, informants represent a university educated, English 
speaking, middle- or upper class segment of the Ethiopian society consisting of males and 
females approximately between the age of 20-50. Therefore, this paper mainly documents the 
elite's perspective on the former leader. Elites are in general those who benefit most from systems 
and from the resources in a given society. Some informants have clearly benefitted from the 
current regime (and some haven't) however, given the political context it is dangerous to point out 
'true supporters'.  
Furthermore it is important to underline that informants are not necessarily exclusively 'pro' or 
'against', although the report suggest this by presenting 'narrative' and 'counter narrative'. This 
serves mainly as an analytical tool. 
 
I aimed at interviewing a broad segment of informants, however, voices from West, South and 
Eastern Ethiopia are present but few. Furthermore, I emphasized the voices of various religious 
groups; Orthodox, Protestants and Muslims.   
The interviews took place in various places; in cafes, restaurants, private homes, at qat 
ceremonies, private offices, government offices, state TV (ETV), at a local media agency, at a 
factory, in classrooms/the garden of the Civil Service University (ECSU) and at Addis Ababa 
University. Some interviews were conducted in public space, but mainly where some degree of 
privacy was possible.  
 
Two of my informants wor in the media industry; one is a journalist at ETV and the other works 
at a local media agency. Other interviewees include a group of women working within the MSE 
initiative, a young party-member and a political adviser. 
 
Furthermore, I conducted sporadic informal conversations with people in cafes, bars, at parties 
and in the street, where I asked people about the images and the billboards around town. This 
group of informants consist of various people for example a taxi driver, an accountant, a shop 
owner and a bar guest. Informal conversations with 'random' people was an indispensable way of 
getting some important opinions. I wanted to let the informants control the conversations 
presenting their former leader to me. Some informants spoke freely and were very critical, others 
expressed a version similar to the government promoted narrative of the former leader. Some 
informants would sometimes jump back and forth between explanations and narratives.  
 
 
26 
To ensure the informants' anonymity and to make their identities unidentifiable I do not refer 
directly to interviewees during the analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Key informants 
A choice to focus on the private and public sector was made in order to explore what the two 
different groups of informants would focus on when explaining the legacy of the former prime 
minister, seemingly representing two poles of society. Furthermore, it would make it possible to 
compare similarities or differences in their explanations.   
Among both groups; businessmen/women and government employees/students, there were a 
tendency to present a picture of the former leader quite similar to the official narrative. 
Interviewees from both groups circled around same key focus points, however, informants from 
the private sector appeared the most committed and loyal to the official narrative.  
 
1. Public sector  
Informants from this segment are composed of students and staff from the Ethiopian Civil 
Service University (ECSU), an employee from the Ministry of Water and two other high level 
government officials. This segment is interesting as government employees are regarded as being 
the guards of the government and the current system, yet they are also regarded as the losers as 
heavy inflation is affecting their salaries.  
In general informants from this segment were loyal to the official narrative about the former 
prime minister, however, during conversations informants would complain about salaries, 
corruption and inflation. This was, however, rarely connected directly to the former leader.  
 
The Ethiopian state employs more than 300.000 civil servants, traditionally Amharas, but in the 
last decades great efforts have been made to mobilize other ethnicities and groups from the 
periphery to the administration. Furthermore, since 1991 efforts have been made to increase the 
overall educational level of the administrative personnel (Aalen&Tronvoll, 2008; Vaughan& 
Tronvoll, 2003). Traditionally, the ECSU recruited EPRDF members, but there is no formal 
relation to the ruling party, though most of the students are members (Vaughan& Tronvoll, 
2003:95). The strategy of the government is capacity building and this also relates to the building 
of an educated class of administrators who are committed to the system, the government and the 
party. Within the administration the ideology of the party goes hierarchically down through the 
system with the cadres being key actors in this structure (Vaughan&Tronvoll, 2003:15).  
The education and training of the cadres consist, amongst others, of broadcastings of the prime 
minister and of a variety of 'training packages' from Ethiopian Ministries and development 
agencies e.g. German GIZ.
2
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Interview students ESCU, December 2012 
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Informants from the ECSU were from different regional states of Ethiopia and all of the 
interviewed students had been working in the administration. Two of them had worked as youth 
and sport leaders. It was obvious that they were used to train others in the government's policy 
and to a great extend there was a pattern in their explanation about Meles Zenawi, all of them 
eager to tell me about their commitment to him.  
 
However, it does says a lot about their situation that two students were desperately asking me for 
information about scholarships abroad and another student was hoping for a future in the private 
sector. A sign of discomfort about their status and future. 
 
2. Private sector  
Informants from the business segment are composed of various businessmen and women, also 
some who had previously worked for the government. 
A businessman, who recently served as a high level government official, explained that he had 
changed his position in favour of the private sector as this was more lucrative.  
Economic development is a central focus point of the ruling elite and as new business elites have 
benefitted from changing economic policies these are regarded as an important and loyal part of 
the elite. As noted the government has a strong presence in most sectors of the economy in 
Ethiopia (Vaughan, Gebremichael, 2011:31). Mainly through the TPLF, the EPRDF constitutes 
the largest private sector owner in Ethiopia. Another key actor in the economy is Sheik Al 
Amoudi, whose business network constitutes the other pillar of the economy (Tronvoll, 
2012:279). Directly or indirectly the government controls key companies in sectors such as 
transport, communication and construction, which are owned or somehow related to the party. In 
addition to its own enterprises, EPRDF also receives large donations from the business sector for 
example during elections (Tronvoll, 2012:280). Significantly, TPLF holds key positions in 
nationalised companies and in the private sector and furthermore, the wife of the former prime 
ministers, Azeb Mesfin, is a key actor in the economy (Lefort, 2012b).  
Since the death of Meles Zenawi several billboards and posters of the former prime minister 
across the country have been sponsored by private companies. 
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4. Communicating to the public                          
This chapter concerns the channels through which the government and the ruling party 
communicate to the public. These channels consist of media and press as well as the 
government's own platforms of communication.  
The second part of the chapter presents the official narrative of the former prime minister from 
government actors, semi-controlled and pro-government actors. 
  
4.1 Channels of government communication 
Ethiopian media is under tight control by the EPRDF and the government, who directly or 
indirectly controls the media and press. International media surveillance organisations, journalist 
federations and human rights organisations (PEN, Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters 
Without Borders, Human Rights Watch) rank Ethiopia high among countries that lacks free and 
independent media and among countries with imprisoned journalist.  
Since 2005 the government has stepped up measures to ban and infiltrate all independent media 
and the majority of newspapers opposing the government are closed (Stremlau, 2011:717). 
Journalists and the media are aware that they must practise strong self-censorship in order not to 
be closed down (Stremlau, 2011:717; BBC, 2007). The government also maintains a powerful 
grip on journalists' organisations such as Ethiopian Free Press Journalist' Association (EFPJA) 
(BBC, 2007).  
 
The authority regulating the media is the Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency (EBA) which is directly 
answerable to the prime minister (BBC,2007). The national broadcaster (ERTA) operates radio 
stations as well as the only TV station, ETV, which broadcasts from Addis Ababa in Amharic, 
Tigrinya, Oromiffa, Somali and English. State run radio, Radio Ethiopia, and ETV are both key 
channels when delivering news from and about the government.    
Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) is a state-run news agency and Walta Information Centre (WIC) 
is a private run but pro-government agency owned by a company closely linked to TPLF (BBC, 
2007).  
 
The press consist of government-attached or pro-government newspapers. The Ethiopian Press 
Agency own some of the largest newspapers for example Addis Zemen (Amharic) and Ethiopian 
Herald (English). After writing about the court case of the imprisoned journalist Eskinder Nega 
and about the demonstrations from the Muslim community, the independent newspaper Feteh was 
closed down in July 2012 and the founder of the newspaper was imprisoned (Davison, 26 July 
2012).  
 
In Ethiopia there is one telecommunication and internet provider, the state-owned Ethio 
Telecom,which, although outsourcing some tasks to private companies, has monopoly. Online 
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news sites such as Nazret.com and some Ethiopian Diasopora's websites/blogs are banned and 
last year Al Jazeera's website was blocked (and still is) after reporting about the two Swedish 
journalists who were imprisoned and accused of terror related activities in 2011.  
 
Besides communicating through press and media the government has established its own 
communication platforms; Woredanet and Schoolnet. These systems allow the national level to 
instruct, teach and deliver political ideas and messages to local levels (Gagliardone, 2013).  
 
The Ministry of Communication and organs related to it are key actors in producing government 
propaganda including political pictures and billboards of Meles Zenawi.
3
 Bereket Simon, 
spokesman of the government, also holds the position as Minister of Communication.  
Before 1991 the Ministry of Communication, at that time The Ministry of Information and 
National Guidance, was likewise closely involved in the publishing and distribution of political 
posters and propaganda of the Derg (Sählstrøm, 1990:117). 
 
The traditional mobilisation forms of the TPLF and the EPRDF are also important to emphasize 
in this context. In order to distribute its messages TPLF preferred oral communication including 
poetry and songs to communicate with the masses during the days of rebellion (Stremlau, 2012). 
 
4.2 The official narrative 
Shortly after the death of Meles Zenawi official statements and condolences were released from 
the TPLF, EPRDF and from Ethiopian media. The following is a summary of the general focal 
points about his policy, leadership, life and personality. 
 
Fighting the Derg 
Meles Zenawi joined the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and contributed to the transformation 
from 'absolutely dictatorial military rule and poverty to democracy and development' (WIC, 21 
August, 2012). He was 'a hero of freedom fighters' (TPLF, 2012) and he became a competent 
leader who 'had the exceptional vision and capacity to initiate and lead change' (Meles portrait, 
EPRDF, 2012:2). 
 
Federalism 
Rulers of previous regimes in Ethiopia originated only from limited parts of the country but had 
managed to oppress the entire population of Ethiopia, including citizens of the regions from 
which the rulers themselves heralded (Meles portrait,EPRDF,2012:10). The new constitution 
'opened the door for the respect of the rights of all nations, nationalities and peoples in a manner 
that was never seen' (TPLF, 2012). 
                                                 
3
 Several billboards in public space for example in the central reserves of both smaller and bigger roads and 
highways were established by private companies and linked to commercials.  
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Democracy  
The former Prime Minister was a 'champion of political pluralism' a democrat who 'welcomes 
dissent and is ready to endorse persuasive, contrary ideas' (Meles portrait,EPRDF, 2012).  
According to Meles Zenawi it was pointless to control the reins of government 'unless we won the 
hearts of the people' (Meles portrait,EPRDF, 2012:5). Without democracy there can be no 
development and democracy has to be rooted in popular participation: 'not just elected officials, 
but hundreds of thousands from Kebele to central government must take active part in self rule' 
(Meles portrait,EPRDF, 2012:5,6). 
He strived to guarantee that the 2005 elections 'would be inclusive, free and fair' and he 'upholds 
democratic principles and the rule of law and insists on the compliance of his party and 
government to these values and practices' (Meles portrait,EPRDF, 2012:10,11).  
Meles Zenawi build a strong leadership and party and this 'enabled the implementation of sound 
development and democratic strategies' (ETV, 21 August 2012).  
 
Development 
'Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is a great leader who was the voice of developing countries' 
(ETV,21 August,2012). Meles Zenawi worked hard to pull Ethiopia 'out of poverty and 
backwardness' (WIC, 21 August,2012). His leadership has played an essential role in generating 
the lines of the anti-poverty struggle and development plan (TPLF, 2012; ETV, 21 August 2012).  
Under the rule of Meles social and economic growth have been achieved 'nearly 10% per annum 
over the decade'. This is without precedent in Ethiopian history and is widely recognized (Meles 
portrait, EPRDF, 2012).  
 
African Icon 
Meles was an African icon, who was able to speak up, not just for Ethiopia, but also for Africa. 
Meles was able to 'articulate the mouth of the poor' to the international community. Therefore his 
leadership did not only play a role in consolidating the acceptance of Ethiopia in the Horn of 
Africa, but also on the continent (ETV, 21 August 2012; Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012: TPLF, 
2012). 'He was a pride of the black people' and 'Africa as a whole has lost a great son' (ETV, 21 
August, 2012). 
 
The Renaissance 
'Meles was a renaissance leader' (ETV, 21 August 2012). By promoting democracy and 
development he ensured 'that a renaissance of the nation was realizable, and was within reach' 
(WIC, 21 August 2012).  'His commitment to building the Dam was a powerful expression of 
defiance against the longstanding loss of confidence in ourselves and our governments' (Meles 
portrait,EPRDF, 2012:8). Although Meles Zenawi passed away the system 'he left with us which 
is as strong as rock, makes us be proud forever, increase our self-confidence and ensures our 
renaissance journey to be irreversible' (ETV, 21 August 2012). 
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Inspiring and giving hope 
'On occasion, history yields outstanding individuals, who’s lives and deeds stand out and endure' 
(WIC, 21 August,2012; Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012). Although Meles Zenawi is no longer alive 
'the popular values he left behind for us are unforgettable and remain with us forever' (TPLF, 
2012:2). Meles Zenawi 'belongs to all and he stood for all' (Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012:10). 
The former prime minister worked relentlessly to show 'Ethiopians a glimmer of hope towards 
prosperity' (ETV, 21 August 2012).  The development paradigm initiated by him has 'kindled a 
sense of self-confidence in the Ethiopian people and hope in a bright future for the country and 
for coming generations' (Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012:12). 
 
Creating peace 
Meles Zenawi  'was a great man of the people who contributed for the prevailing of peace' (ETV, 
21 August 2012). He was committed to create peace within Ethiopia as well as on the continent 
and he contributed to peace in Somalia, Sudan, Burundi and Congo. His ambitions in this regard 
remain unforgettable (Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012). 
 
Sacrificing himself 
Meles sacrificed himself for the people of Ethiopia and he was working day and night to benefit 
the country. Drawing attention to himself or his accomplishments was not his style; 'Above all, 
the motive for our focus on the man himself is that Meles never liked either to speak or to hear 
about himself. “I” is perhaps the rarest word in his discourse' (Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012). 
Meles was studying hard; reading, debating and writing and his teaching of new ideas was always 
supported by in-depth research (Meles portrait, EPRDF, 2012). 
 
Following Meles' path 
'The thoughts of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi are now shared by over 80 million Ethiopians' 
(ETV, 21 August 2012). Although Meles departed physically his popular values will remain 
forever and the leadership in Ethiopia as well as Ethiopian citizens are committed to follow the 
line of Meles  (Meles portrait, EPRDF.2012). '..the Secretariat would like to assure you that the 
leadership and members of the EPRDF will strive in a higher manner ever than before to bring to 
the desired goal the vision of our country and realize its renaissance by following the footprints 
of our leader, Comrade Meles Zenawi´.(EPRDF, September 2012)  
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5. Meles - the Developer                                                                
This chapter examines the presentation and framing of Meles Zenawi as a development icon; the 
construction of his legacy within the framework of the state discourse - developmentalism.  
The first section is based on interviews which present a narrative closely related to the 
government discourse. The second section outlines the counter-narrative to the government-
promoted narrative and the third part explores the understanding of development that lies implicit 
in the official narrative. Finally, the development discourse of Meles Zenawi is placed in a 
historical context.  
 
5.1 Leading the people to development  
 
'The vision and the mission that you started is near. By working hard we will get it/hold it'  
Meskel Square, Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
On the billboard pictured above, from Meskel Square in Addis Ababa, Meles Zenawi is placed in 
the front raising his hand to the sky. Behind him we are presented with the development 
achievements. To the left the new complex of the African Union towers above; a US$200 million 
building funded and build by the China State Construction Company (Africa Research Bulletin, 
2012a). Behind Meles we see the infrastructure and housing projects and lastly to the right, the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam; the new power project. 
At the bottom of the billboard the Ethiopian flag is waving in the wind. The text in Amharic 
expresses the commitment to the former leader and his development vision.  
 
This billboard and the matching text/slogan is a classic example of a political poster in Ethiopia. 
Like many other billboards, Meles Zenawi is the only person on the picture, centrally placed and 
in front of the development projects. In general the billboards, statements and slogans refers to 
progress and future including forward-looking words such as; 'development', 'working hard', 'next 
generation' and 'achieving goals'. 
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It is not difficult to see the similarities between the style of propaganda performed in 
contemporary Ethiopia and the tradition of propaganda from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
North Korea and states in the Middle East (Sählstrøm, 1990; Wedeen, 1999). Posters are similar 
to a socialist/ communist tradition and although there is no hammer and sickle referring to 
communism the form is alike; totalising, dominating, playing on heroism and occupying public 
space with a clear message about progress and loyalty to the leader. 
 
5.1.1 Following Meles' path 
Meles Zenawi had strong ambitions 'to make the country able to compete and to make the country 
excellent.'
4
 According to a government official Meles Zenawi will first and foremost be 
remembered for his economic achievements which have moved Ethiopia into a new phase. Right 
now it is his era and the era of development.
5
 A businessman underlined that Meles Zenawi's 
primary goal was to eliminate the history of poverty and famine in Ethiopia: 'Ato Meles basic 
visions were development and never again famine.'
6 
Meles was pro-poor and the commitment to 
fight poverty became a well-known and important mantra in Ethiopia. According to a Harari 
businessman 'everyone is memorizing what he said.'
7 
  
 
The development achievements under the rule of Meles were endless; construction, 
infrastructure, housing, health, education and prevention of unemployment. Meles Zenawi 
transformed the economy of the country, he facilitated the private sector and promoted growth.
8
 A 
student explained that under previous regimes development was concentrated around the larger 
cities, but Meles Zenawi's development strategy first and foremost embraced the rural areas. 
Meles supported farmers and pastoralist; for example, he inspired the farmers to double their 
production.
9
 
 
Compared to other African countries Ethiopia has few resources such as oil, gold and other 
metals. Naturally, the development strategy had to fit this environment so instead of 
concentrating on the country’s lack of natural resources and capital, Meles Zenawi focused on the 
country's wealth of land and especially of human resources. A businesswoman explained that she 
had experienced an inspiring speech by the former prime minister, where he highlighted 
Ethiopia’s advantage in terms of human capacity and other qualities essential for the development 
of the country. This generated hope and inspiration, which will remain present even without the 
prime minister at the helm. She explained: 'The late prime minister made everyone believe in him. 
He is not dead yet for me. When Ethiopia is a developed country I will say that he died. He gave 
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 Interview businessman, 14 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
5
 Interview government official, 27 November 2012, Addis Ababa  
6
 Interview businessman, 29 November 2012, Addis Ababa  
7
 Interview Harari businessman, 23 November 2012 
8
 Interview businessman, 14 December 2012, Addis Ababa / Businessman 29 November 2012, Addis Ababa  
9
 Interview student, 11 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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potentials to all Ethiopians.'10 
 
Several interviewees stated that the comprehensive and long term development vision of Meles 
Zenawi would be followed even in the absence of his presence. A student explained: 'Even though 
there is a new prime minister, it is only personal change, not change of strategy. Everything stays 
the same.'
11 
There might be a change in person but not in ruling pattern, ideology or vision. 
However, there is a risk that the implementation of the strategy might fail in the absence of the 
ideologist. According to a businessman: 'Meles brings the ideas and others has to take care of the 
implementation which can be criticized'. Furthermore he explained: 'If something was not 
working Meles would change it. When he was alive the result was never wrong.''12 
Owing to Meles Zenawi a student explained: 'He saw the visions. We Ethiopians did not always 
understand development in Ethiopia, but he understood it in a perfect way.'13  
 
Hence the path of Meles Zenawi must be followed as he is the only one able to guide Ethiopians 
into the future, because he understood the future and he was able to 'read the future'
14.
for his 
country. 
A businessman, who had previously worked as a government official, explained that Meles made 
efforts to build a strong system and he trained the people before his death; 'He crafted the future. 
The direction. It will be implemented. The public committed themselves. Before his death he was 
training everybody. So nothing will change.''15 
 
Car covered with the image of Meles Zenawi. Addis Ababa, December 2012 
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 Interview businesswoman, 26. November 2012 
11
 Interview student, 11 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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 Interview businessman, 29 November 2012, Addis Ababa 
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 Interview student, 11 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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 Interview intellectual, 13 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
15
 Interview businessman, 23 November 2012 
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5.1.2 The Renaissance Dam - development and power 
In the beginning of 2011 the former prime minister announced the construction of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, formerly known as the Millennium Dam or Project X. The 
comprehensive hydropower project is expected to increase Ethiopia's economy due to export of 
electricity to neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Sudan thus cementing Ethiopia's  role in 
the region. The Ethiopian authorities emphasize the role of the Ethiopian people in the funding of 
the dam. International donors such as the World Bank have not provided loans to the project due 
to the issue of regional geo-strategic interests. 
 
'Renaissance' is a political motto referred to in almost all slogans and on billboards. Previously, 
political slogans were centred around 'millennium' due to the Ethiopian millennium celebrations 
in 2001. Entering a new millennium Ethiopia was also entering a new phase; a phase of optimism 
and prospect. Now 'renaissance' is the buzz word of the government. In a famous speech during a 
visit to Africa in 1998 Bill Clinton expressed optimism on the 'new generation of African leaders 
devoted to democracy and economic reform. Among the leaders pictured as 'Renaissance 
Leaders' were Meles Zenawi (ICG, 2009). 
 
On billboards, posters and postcards Meles Zenawi is depicted in front of the Nile River, Abay, or 
the Dam construction. The dam symbolises development, power and progress and as the largest 
of all development projects it represents all development achievements in the country. The 
hydropower project on the Nile River is preferably presented as another one of Meles Zenawi's 
great development ideas. Many previous leaders had ambitions to explore the Blue Nile but only 
Meles succeeded in coming up with the plan and actually realizing it.
16
  
Meles was not just the initiator of this development initiative; he was behind all the development 
ideas. According to a local media employee: 'As an individual he started all the projects. Every 
leader in Ethiopia has been dreaming about this, but he made the dream come true. Personally, 
he started all the projects.''17 
 
Billboards and posters refer to the hydropower project as being the will of the Ethiopian people 
and according to a student: 'the strategy is no longer only Meles' idea, it is everybody’s idea and 
everyone is supporting it and contributing to it. Everyone is buying more and more bonds.'
18 
According to businessmen and students all citizens support and contribute to the dam. And 
although the tax funding the dam came unexpected, everybody was prepared to contribute.
19
 
                                                 
16
    Interview student, 6. December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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 Interview local media employee, 2 December 2012 
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 Interview student 6. December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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    Interview student, 6. December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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'We have the right as well as the capacity to use Abay River. We will finance/facilitate in everything of the Abay Construction'. 
Postcard sold in the streets in Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
When building a cult then songs and poems are important tools to present the heroic acts of a 
leader. When Meles Zenawi passed away memorial songs were released about him and about the 
Nile. A student explained the purpose of the songs: 'The songs are also used as an appreciation of 
Meles as a leader. (…) Songs are released for Prime Minister Meles and now after his death 
songs are also released about that we will not stop what you have started, we are following your 
idea. All of this is described in the songs.'
20
  
Additionally, rumour has it that the name of the hydropower project might change again. This 
time to 'Meles Dam' honouring the memory of the former leader.
21
 
 
5.1.3 We can do it! Creating a positive atmosphere  
The development vision of Meles Zenawi is provided to all citizens in Ethiopia.
22
 A journalist 
from ETV explained that the channel covers the development statistics from the largest cities and 
from the largest companies such as Ethiopian Airlines. ETV broadcasts programmes about 
development in rural areas, women’s rights and the success of the MSE initiative, including the 
successful cobblestone projects which lifts people out of poverty and improves the infrastructure. 
The programmes about development are creating awareness, inspiring the youth and enhances the 
feeling of; 'you can do it yourself.'
23
 
 
According to a government official Meles Zenawi will be remembered for changing the image of 
Ethiopia, domestically, regionally and internationally due to his development commitment. 
Usually regarded as the breadbasket of Africa, Meles Zenawi was able to reform the image.
24
 
In the words of a businessman 'We are no longer a country known for famine but for 
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 Interview student, 11 December 2012 
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 Interview ETV Journalist, 5. December 2012 
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 Interview Student, 11 December 2012, Interview journalist ETV, 5 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
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 Interview ETV journalist,  5 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
24
 Interview government official, 27 November 2012, Addis Ababa  
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development.'
25 
This 'uprising' of the nation was connected to the ambitions on the Nile River. For 
centuries the river benefitted the neighbouring countries, but finally Ethiopia stood up for itself. 
The journalist from ETV explained: 'Ethiopians are united about this as never before. This is the 
only development project that can unite the Ethiopians. People have been angry about this for a 
long time.'
26
 
 
 
'Meles was a leader who worked hard for the change of our city and its people.  
We will promise to work hard to achieve his goals' 
Meskel square, Addis Ababa, December 2012, sponsored by Addis Ababa Municipality  
 
 
When revealing project X Meles Zenawi spoke directly to his population and the rhetoric was 'yes 
we can!' similar to the famous Obama campaign in 2008. Several informants explained that this 
rhetoric was encouraging and could be captured in two ways; firstly, the individual could turn this 
hope inside in order to improve his/her own life and secondly, it was uniting people within a 
national goal. Meles Zenawi and the government aimed to mobilise and unify the people through 
this 'positive' agenda. 
 
The populistic rhetoric appeared easy to pick-up. Almost repeating the slogans on the political 
posters in public space an employee from the Ministry of Water explained: 'Everybody can do 
something now. I will do everything I can to fulfil the late prime ministers vision and follow his 
footsteps. We all have to work hard for the Renaissance Dam.'
27
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Billboard in front of Sheraton Hotel, Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
5.2 The development agenda as a power tool 
The previous sections examined how the legacy of the former prime minister is connected to the 
development agenda. This section outlines various opinions that oppose the dominating narrative 
about Meles Zenawi's development discourse and achievements. 
 
5.2.1 Development and the 2005 election 
Most interviewees; businessmen/women, government employees, cadres, intellectuals and critical 
opponents of the regime expressed that the development vision; the strategy, the rhetoric and the 
mobilization was a direct outcome of the 2005 election. The election was a turning point for 
Meles Zenawi's leadership and it led to a change in his strategy towards the public. According to 
informants Meles was not popular during most of his ruling time. For example a young party-
member explained 'during the first fifteen years of Meles rule, nothing was done for the people'
28 
and another interviewee, a businesswoman, stated that 'for a long time he was not popular among 
the people.'
29
 
 
The development agenda was Meles Zenawi's attempt to shift people's attitude in favour of the 
government. A male interviewee explained: 'Everybody in all cities refused to elect the EPRDF 
because nothing was done for them; nothing was done for the people. After that the party 
rearranged their politics (…) development is the result of the 2005 election. During the last seven 
years they understood that if their politics did not change to benefit the poor then they would not 
be able to stay in power. They got out of the problems.'
30
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A student put it even sharper: 'In 2005 we had an uprising in the streets. After that Meles took his 
measures. He used the stick and carrot approach. In 2005 192 young people were killed on his 
order. He chooses this action. He is decisive.'
31
 The development policy propagated by Meles is 
thus first and foremost an outcome of a regime in panic and therefore primarily about control, 
power and manipulation. 
 
5.2.2 Social inequality, 'poor quality' development and manipulated statistics 
Ethiopia is considered one of the poorest countries in the world and Meles Zenawi did not 
manage to lift his people out of poverty. Despite the high growth rates presented by the 
authorities poverty has not been reduced and according to informants development was far from 
broad based. Interviewees explained that 'most people never benefitted from the development 
agenda under his leadership'
32 
or 'people are living below any standard'
33
 or 'there are changes in 
Ethiopia but the majority is not getting anything out of this system.'
34
  
In the official narrative Meles Zenawi's development agenda embraces all groups and segments 
of society. A deep concern about increasing social inequality contradicts this narrative. According 
to a young party-member 'it is not possible to erode the gap between rich and poor from this 
system now. There is a big gap now.'
35 
 
 
The Ethiopian government has shown impressive economic statistics during the last years, which 
is widely recognized and praised by international institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. Yet, informants expressed scepticism about these statistics. For example a male interviewee 
explained that 'the government are manipulating the statistics. All Ethiopians are aware of this 
manipulation.'
36
The blind trust in Ethiopian authorities of international institutions was criticised: 
'The World Bank and the IMF think that Ethiopia is a stabile island. They will not criticize. In 
stead of letting things develop naturally, they are supporting this government.'
37
 
 
While some development achievements were acknowledged by most interviewees, for instance 
improvements in health, education and infrastructure, the quality of these achievements was also 
questioned and criticised. 
 
5.2.3 Inflation and corruption 
Informants expressed negative views on the economy and complained about inflation and loss in 
purchasing power. According to an intellectual the population do not actually experience the high 
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growth rates hyped by the government; 'Is this the consequences of the high growth? That is what 
they say. But if there is real growth then livelihoods has to be improved. This is simply hiding the 
truth.´
38
 A general impression was that most informants would like to believe in the economic 
growth, but at the same time expressed that life was getting harder. As an interviewee concluded: 
'The consequences of failing development are also something we pay.'
39
 
 
In sharp contrast to the picture of Meles Zenawi as a committed fighter against corruption 
interviewees expressed a deep concern about this issue. In fact most interviewees claimed that the 
system developed under his rule was promoting corruption and nepotism rather than preventing 
it. According to a critical opponent 'Corruption is growing and corruption is created by him'
40
. A 
similar claim was also made by another informant: 'There is a chain from the bottom to the top. 
This relationship is hard to overlook.'
41
 
Informal networks were regarded as a direct obstacle to any kind of development. It requires 
loyalty or a direct connection to the party to benefit from the current economic policy. For 
example, in order to become a part of the MSE initiative membership is required. According to a 
young party-member: 'the MSE are used as a weapon of the government. MSE is good for the 
economy, but it is a political instrument. (...) No one is free from politics in this country.'
42
 
 
5.2.4 Mobilization to next election 
A male interviewee explained that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was presented at a 
strategic time in 2011 during the initial phase of the Arab uprising. Egypt, who traditionally has 
monopoly on the Nile, was weakened, which was an advantage for Ethiopia and as the Ethiopian 
government also feared a popular uprising the project was a perfect opportunity to shift people's 
attention away from chaos towards a unifying development goal. The interviewee concluded 
'Meles was smart and he knew about changing the focus and changing the focus of the people in 
Ethiopia!''
43
 
 
The hydropower project contributed to Meles Zenawi's image building; it made him into a 
national hero fighting for the interest of his country. Several interviewees claimed that the project 
is the glue holding the government and the people together. According to a political adviser: 'This 
is why they will be able to win the 2015 election without Meles.'
44
 This claim was also made by 
another interviewee emphasizing that the dam 'has become the future for Ethiopia.'
45
  
An interviewee explained that Meles understood how to present initiatives as his own unique 
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ideas although, if the idea to exploit the Nile River is taken as an example, this was also an idea 
under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie. Meles, however, turned the dam into something new. In 
fact Meles knew how to present the very idea of 'development' as something new although the 
state had always propagated new development policies.
46
 
 
5.3 From underdevelopment to development 
In the development concept lies the understanding of Ethiopia as going from a back warded past 
following a linear path to progress in the future. The idea is to bring society from a traditional to a 
modern phase, from underdevelopment to development. Underdevelopment is thus constructed as 
being the actual problem in the country. According to Meles Zenawi the peripheral regions, now 
backwards in terms of civilization, would soon become examples of rapid development 
(Plaut,2012:650).  
 
In public space Meles Zenawi is presented as Ethiopia’s development ideologist; a leader who 
was able to see, shape and create the future for his country. The strategy seems effective; all the 
time progress is made and growth statistics indicates that every year is better than the previous 
year. The EPRDF lauds itself for its achievements in terms of economic growth both domestically 
and internationally and claims that economy is the reason for them being in power (Hagmann& 
Abbink, 2012:582; Tronvoll,2012). 
 
5.3.1 Depoliticising 'development' 
In the official government-promoted narrative and in the overlapping narrative presented to me 
by interviewees Meles Zenawi's solution is the only political solution. In the official narrative 
there is one definition of progress and future and one way to understand development which is 
determined by Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF. Furthermore, the strategy of Meles Zenawi 
embraces all groups and all people in Ethiopia even groups that are contradictory in its nature. 
Competitive interests in society are denied; all people in Ethiopia want the same. 
 
In an authoritarian system power rest partly on the ability of a leadership to manipulate and 
convince the population that there is no other alternatives to its policy. By occupying public space 
with propaganda and symbols alternative ideas and ideologies are prevented from gaining 
ground. The population is not treated as competent political actors or citizens, but instead as 
masses that need a dominant leader to guide them. People in Ethiopia do not know  what they 
want or how they are supposed to enter the future. The widespread propaganda in public space  
reminds the population of this.  
 
The dam building exemplifies the modernist idea and the development obsession, when large 
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scale energy projects are set to erode backwardness in Ethiopia (Abbink, 2012). It reflects a 
technocratic approach to development that suits the understanding of development within 
international institutions and donor communities. Citizens in a development country like Ethiopia 
are seen as apolitical entities whose underdevelopment can be removed through the large 
infrastructure projects. Hence the Ethiopian government is able to gain support from the donor 
community for its efforts to promote this particular policy (Abbink,2012:125). 
 
5.3.2 Ethiopia's long history of modernisation  
Since the rule of Menelik I, perhaps even before, the objective of leaders in Ethiopia has been 
modernisation (Young, 1997:62). Inspired by America emperor Haile Selassie propagated market 
economy, initiated an industrialisation process and improved the education system. By his time 
he was a modernisation icon, a prime symbol of Ethiopia's development process and additionally 
exemplified as an icon of African pride in an international context (Sählstrom, 1990:12).  
When the Derg came to power the modernisation project of the emperors was rejected. Haile 
Selassie's era of capitalism and elite modernisation was understood and presented to the public as 
the true period of backwardness since only a small part of the population had benefitted from this 
policy (Donham, 1999). Instead the Derg was inspired by the Soviet and engaged in a 
socialism/communist inspired modernisation process based on land reforms (Sählstrøm, 1990). 
However, by the end of the 1980 Mengistu distanced himself from socialism and although 
claiming a fundamentally different policy he ended up promoting a modernisation discourse that 
was in many ways similar to the ones of the emperors (Donham, 1999). 
 
Meles Zenawi and the post 1991 government has done its best to negate ruling patterns and 
policies of former regimes. Previous periods are understood as 'dark ages' and the TPLF and 
Meles Zenawi liberated the country from the horrible times of famine, repression and 
backwardness during the socialist-military rule. Instead the EPRDF initially stated that 
democracy was a precondition for development and poverty reduction (Hagmann&Abbink, 
2012:586). Yet, TPLF and Meles Zenawi had adopted the democratisation and development 
discourse just before coming to power after originally building their movement on marxism  
(Donham, 1999:182).  
Throughout his ruling period Meles Zenawi's philosophy about democracy and development has 
remained unclear. His theory rejects and includes both socialism and capitalism and he never 
fully explained his theory about 'the democratic development state' (DeWaal, 2012:1). First and 
foremost his idea has been flexible and adaptable to new circumstances (Hagmann, 2012; Bach, 
2012). After the 2005 election Meles Zenawi propagated a development discourse that seems to 
share many similarities with the past. Visually and rhetorically the development propaganda  
resembles the propaganda of the Derg, emphasising 'struggle', 'sacrifice', 'development' and 
'progress'. In his tradition of propaganda, Mengistu was likewise placed among various 
development projects and initiatives (Sählstrøm, 1990:94,87). 
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Meles Zenawi also drew on Haile Selassie's leadership model presenting himself as a modern 
diplomat, a moderniser of his people and additionally an African icon, embodying African 
independence. Like Haile Selassie, Meles was popular in the West and he understood how to 
brand himself as a leader representing Africa. And similarly to Haile Selassie it appears that 
Meles Zenawi was more loved abroad than inside his own country. 
 
Placing Meles Zenawi in a historical context thus reveals that development obsession is not a new 
phenomenon in Ethiopia. In fact rulers since Menelik I have implemented 'development policies' 
that have first and foremost served to demonstrate state power (Clapham, 2006:110). Although 
economic policies in Ethiopia has changed radically during the last century from Haile Selassie's 
capitalist model to Mengistu's socialist model and again to Meles' blurred development vision, 
modernisation ideology has been at the core (Kefale, 2011:2; Donham, 1999; Clapham, 2006). 
Entering a stage of modernity seems as an obsession for the rulers and history presents a line of 
leaders forcing often irrational plans upon people trying to promote progress in order to eliminate 
'backwardness' (Donham, 1999:150). In this narrative of modernity the Ethiopian highland is 
understood as the modern, whereas the periphery is the truly back warded. The past, based on a 
dominant understanding of history, presents a story of linear progress from the very beginning of 
humanity itself and from an ancient and glorious time.
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Implicit lies an understanding of the 
northern part of Ethiopia as the most developed as this is where the nation-state derived from, 
distinguished from the underdeveloped periphery (Donham, 1999:129). 
 
In conclusion the aim of all three leaders, Haile Selassie, Mengistu and Meles, was to be framed 
as leaders who could move Ethiopia towards a new and better future. Furthermore, they had their 
ambition to modernise, not to democratise, in common. 
                                                 
47
 The 'great tradition' narrative will be explained in the following chapter 
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6. Meles – the Patriot                                   
This chapter focuses on the framing of Meles Zenawi as a patriot and a national hero. It illustrates 
how national symbols in contemporary Ethiopia facilitate authoritarian rule and it explains how 
the regime trough propaganda and symbolism increasingly promotes a pan-national discourse. 
Section 6.2 outlines counter-narratives to the official narrative of Meles Zenawi and to the state-
formation project of the EPRDF. Lastly, section 6.3 compares the current project of the EPRDF to 
state formation projects of former rulers. 
   
 
'Father of Peace' 
Postcard sold in the streets in Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
 
6.1 National symbolism in public space 
National symbols can take various shapes and include not only flags, songs, official national 
days, traditional clothes and monuments but in a wider perspective also national heroes, fairy 
tales, oral literature, educational practices and military codes (Geisler, 2005:xx). National 
symbols are entirely constructed and depending on political power and political discourse the 
symbolism can change and adapt. However, the very function of the symbolism is that over time 
it becomes normalised and naturalised to a point where it becomes impossible to think of 
alternatives (Geisler, 2005). 
 
Heavy symbolism and propaganda is often deployed in times of crisis, unrest or revolution 
(Sählström, 1990). In case of internal or external pressure on the state the symbolism supports, or 
rather manipulates, citizens' sense of national identity and loyalty in order to make sure that the 
centre of the state stays in power (Geisler, 2005).  
Since the death of the Prime Minister Ethiopia has experienced an increase in propaganda 
enhancing nationalistic rhetoric and symbolism. In an authoritarian context such symbolism 
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serves both as a tool to foster loyalty to the established leadership and as a tool to link the present 
to a point of national origin; the past which is said to have shaped the nation. The symbolism thus 
represents both regime dominance and simultaneously it facilitates a process of nation-building 
promoting a discourse of national unity (Wedeen, 1999:13). 
 
After 1991 Meles Zenawi and the TPLF had to renew the national identity and fabricate a 
discourse of nationalism on something different than the former rulers. In order to legitimise its 
rule; a minority group who fought against a repressive centralised system now in charge of the 
whole state, power was decentralised according to an ethnic-based model. Reshaping the state 
transformed how people defined state identity and citizenship. While rulers had for centuries 
emphasised a pan-national discourse, the new system promoted a discourse of ethnic 
particularism (Hagmann &Abbink, 2012). However, mainly since 2001, when Meles Zenawi was 
threatened on power and territory, greater steps were taken towards state centralisation. This 
included not only an administrative centralisation through control of the regions and co-optation 
of regional elites, but also a centralisation process in terms of symbolic narration. The national 
discourse is increasingly reproduced reflecting a specific approach to history which reactivates a 
narrative about the glorious past. Today, after the death of Meles Zenawi, this national discourse 
is increasingly intensified.  
Furthermore as we shall see Meles Zenawi now personifies the state in a more explicit way. The 
following sections explore and discuss the current national symbolism connected to the 
cultivation of personality cult. But before this the 'great tradition' narrative shall be examined 
further.  
 
 
6.1.1 'Great Tradition' history  
In conventional history writing the national narrative dates back to fourth-century BC, the 
Axumite Kingdom, and begins with Queen Sheebas visit to King Solomon of Israel, where she 
introduces Christianity. The succession of Ethiopian emperors can be traced back to this myth 
which is strengthened by the national script, Kibre Negest, that affirmed rule as divine. Axum 
was a powerful kingdom and the place where political development of Ethiopia began (Clapham, 
2002:38). The decline of the Kingdom of Axum resulted in periods of 'dark ages' but with the 
construction of the Churches of Lalibela a renewal of the past began. Then 'outsiders' entered the 
area and ended this period, however the dark era ended with the rise of Gondar. Later, around 
mid-19th century the brave Emperor Tewodros managed to unite the kingdom (ibid.).  
The history of Ethiopia is furthermore the story of a bastion of African independence and pride; 
King Menelik was able to form resistance against the Italians and under his rule a modernising 
process took shape. After the Second World War Emperor Haile Selassie continued the country's 
modernisation process and until he was overthrown by the Derg in 1974 Ethiopia was an old 
imperial system. After the regime of Mengistu the Ethiopian state was transformed (ibid.) 
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The 'great tradition' narrative glorifies a mythical past that is long gone.  Nonetheless, it presents 
a history of the state evolving from ancient times ending with the present state centred in the 
capital, Addis Ababa (Clapham, 2002; Toggia, 2008:321). 
In this history the Ethiopian highland is in focus presented as the place where history and state 
derived from. As Amharas and Tigrays are the direct descendants of Axum, they represent the 
'real' Ethiopians. This gives highlanders a history and other groups a sub-history; presented as 
people who eventually became part of the 'greater tradition' narrative and incorporated into the 
national state (Clapham, 2002:40).  
In a state representing more than 80 ethnicities this narrative is exclusive rather than inclusive. 
Although the narrative is important for some Christian highlanders it is connected to a process of 
internal colonialism by other groups, who see the state formation process as a colonial project 
where highlanders colonised areas into what is now considered to be the state (ICG, 2009:3). 
 
 
6.1.2 The Renaissance Dam - linking past, present and future 
As noted previously, the Renaissance metaphor is an often used tool in the current propaganda 
and the large hydropower project has been given the name 'the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam'. The Dam symbolises Ethiopia's entire development process as 'the journey to the 
renaissance'. Moreover, the Renaissance Dam also reflects a clear storyline representing the past, 
present and the future of Ethiopia. A young party-member explained how the dam reflects both 
past and present: 'this is a new phase for Ethiopia with the Dam. In 3000 years there has been a 
great nation in Ethiopia. Now there is no civilization. We are a 3. world country, a development 
country. This will change now, in three years when the dam is finished and completed.'
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I was told by informants that the core of Meles Zenawi's legacy is bringing back the Great 
Ethiopia. The present is connected to the glorious past thereby assuming that the current 
renaissance or 'rebirth' will make the country strong and powerful again. To illustrate a local 
media employee explained why the hydropower project had been given the name 'Renaissance 
Dam': 'It is because of the relationship to Axum that it is called the Renaissance dam. This is 
bringing back the history from then, from Axum, till now. It is combining the past and the present, 
and it has already been written into the history of Ethiopia.'
49 
 
 
The dam is thus associated to an era 3.000 years ago; to the story of the Axumite Kingdom 
regarded as the birthplace of the state and the nation. This narrative has an implicit political 
function; it presents a clear storyline about the past and about political rule evolving naturally 
from this historical era thereby legitimising and glorifying the current state and the current 
leadership (Clapham, 2002:41).  
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'Hero. The first Leader who makes use of Abay for our country' 
Postcard sold in the streets in Addis Ababa, December 2012  
 
In order to suit the needs of a specific political agenda in a specific given time myths can be 
reused and reinterpreted (Rees, 2004:22). The symbolism of the Renaissance Dam reactivates the 
'greater tradition' narrative as it links the present to a point of national origin; the past that is said 
to have shaped the nation. Moreover, it also reflects the governments ambitions to move focus 
from an emphasis of ethnic particularism to one of pan-national Ethiopian unity. Previously, the 
dam was called 'Millennium Dam' related to the 'millennium' rhetoric focusing on building a new 
Ethiopia. This rhetoric is now replaced by slogans focusing not only on a brighter future for 
Ethiopia, but on the revival of a glorious past connected to a particular area, a particular people 
and a particular religion in Ethiopia (Mohammed, 2011).   
 
Although the current regime makes efforts to downplay religious symbolism in politics and in  
propaganda it implicitly enhances Christianity by promoting the glorious past.  
 
On the picture below a white dove combines the commitment of the people (text) with the 
Renaissance Dam.  
 
From leaflet collected in Addis Ababa, December 2012  
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Authoritarian regimes appropriate symbols that stimulate a sense of national pride of a glorious 
past in order to promote unity. The renaissance propaganda clearly aims to form 'groupness' and 
pride, presenting a common national goal that should mobilise people. 
 The dam is said to set aside the ethnic and religious differences in the state and several times 
informants compared the Renaissance Dam to an 'unusual' national feeling. A student explained: 
'The feeling of nationalism, sense of nationalism is never seen before in Ethiopia. (...) it is 
creating nationality to a great degree.(...) The most important thing is that the Renaissance Dam 
makes people rise up with the same feeling at the same time.''
50
  
 
 
'Architect of the Renaissance'  
Billboard in Dire Dawa, December 2012 
 
 
6.1.3 Flag Day 
In order to control and monopolise how people define national identity a regime construct 
symbols that serves their interest and their political discourse. This includes parades, celebrations 
and festivals (Wedeen, 1999:13). The celebration of 'Ethiopian National Flag Day' is a relatively 
new phenomenon instituted in 2008 (Hagmann and Abbink, 2012:586). In October 2012 the fifth 
Flag Day was celebrated with different events throughout the country. Due to the sudden death of 
prime minister Meles Zenawi the celebrations were first postponed a few weeks and then 
dedicated to him under the theme 'Lifting our flag up, we will realize the renaissance devised by 
Prime Minister Meles' (Ethiopian Herald, October 2012).  
Prior to the celebrations the chairperson of the National Flag Day Celebration Committee urged 
the population to arrange activities honouring the celebrations and honouring the former prime 
minister. He explained that 'the current generation should use the flag to fight poverty as our 
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fathers did to defeat aggressors' (Ethiopian Herald, October 2012). 
The Ethiopian flag is said to represent the history of the country as the tricolour theme is similar 
to the official banner of the Solomonic Dynasty (Ethiopian Herald, 28 November,2012). During 
the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie the national flag featured the emblem of the Lion of Judah, a 
crowned lion with a cross, which symbolized the link between people, nation and Church. With 
the Derg coming to power this emblem was removed. The current national emblem of the flag, 
the star, represents both the diversity and the unity of the country (Ethiopian Herald, october 
2012).  
 
The national flag has thus had different emblems defining the political ideology and state project 
of the different regimes. When the EPRDF came to power it presented a new flag with a new 
emblem in order to distance their rule from previous ruler. During the last years festivals  
celebrating the national flag have been implemented. Ironically, Meles Zenawi originally said that 
the national flag was 'just a piece of cloth' (Hagmann and Abbink, 2012:586). However, towards 
the end of his rule he embraced the national flag, elevated it and used it to appropriate the 
narrative of the glorious past, a narrative that he in his early days had tried to break with. Proving 
the national discourse his coffin was draped in the national flag at his death.   
 
At the Flag Day celebrations in Addis Ababa in 2012 participants on the spectator seats held up 
pictures that when put together composed an image of the former prime minister and additional 
pictures of him were also present during the event (Diretube.com, 30 October 2012). Flag Day 
thus resembles traditions in other authoritarian regimes such as North Korea, where festivals 
mainly aim to visualise the people's appreciation of their leader. 
While images of Meles were not central elements at previous celebrations, this year's festival was 
rhetorically and visually dominated by the presence of the death leader. Post mortem Meles 
Zenawi is now the one being celebrated. Flag Day thus links people, nation and man, when it  
combines these three components in one celebration. In a more explicit manner Meles Zenawi 
now embodies the state. As Rees (2004) notes, a leader cult attempts to create a point of reference 
for the whole belief system of a regime centred on one man.  
 
 
6.1.4 Nations, Nationalities and People's Day - diversity, unity and renaissance 
Nations, Nationalities and People's Day have been celebrated since 2005. In order to 
commemorate the constitution the government arranges this celebration which takes place on 
different dates in different regions and with the presence of high level government officials. In 
2012 this day was celebrated under the slogan: Our Constitution for Diversity, Unity and 
Renaissance.  
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Placard of the 7th Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Day 2005 (2012) 
 
The logo of the national day pictured above is seen on posters and banners in public space and on 
leaflets. Meles Zenawi, the architect of the constitution, the federalist system and the 
development state is pointing his finger towards his country and perhaps the future; indicating 
once again that Meles will show us the direction. The outline of the country is growing from the 
constitution and the country is presented as a development hub embraced by the different 
nationalities. On this placard of the event as well as at the actual event all the regional flags are 
represented, however, the national flag is either the tallest or the largest.  
 
Nations, Nationalities and People's Day celebrated a founding moment in Ethiopia; the moment 
where the constitution provided a new start. Meles Zenawi was a key actor in this process and as 
stated by government officials this national day will now function to commemorate the former 
prime minister (Hibre Biher,2012:2). Thus, in reality 'Nation, Nationalities and People's Day' now 
(also) celebrates Meles Zenawi.  
 
At the celebration day in Harar in December 2012 huge parades were orchestrated, when citizens 
rallied to the stadium with banners and pictures of the former prime minister. Such regime 
organized festivals and demonstrations become an occasion for the leadership to stimulate 
citizens' feeling of participation. The mobilisation indicates actual participation, while the process 
of the event is in fact completely controlled from above. Secondly, it is an opportunity for the 
leadership to visually ground political thinking in images and symbols in order to shape and 
control how people should understand themselves and their nationality (Koch, 2013:44; Wedeen, 
1999:19). 
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6.1.5 Sport is one of the developments 
The picture below of a billboard near the national stadium in Addis Ababa was erected in mid 
December 2012; almost three months after the death of the former prime minister. It presents 
Meles Zenawi among Ethiopian athletes and stadiums surrounded by the national flag. 
 
 
 
 'Sport is one of the developments. We work hard, equally with the other development plans'  
'We keep our promise and we will make your vision come through'  
 Billboard near Stadium, Addis Ababa, December 2012. Sponsored by Addis Ababa Sport Commission 
 
 
Since the death of the prime minister various occasions, events and places have been named after 
him and his legacy has been given the credit for various success-stories. For example, Meles' 
legacy took the credit for the achievements and victories of the national football team during the 
Africa Cup of Nations in 2012.
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 Additionally, the 2012/2013 football premier league is now 
called 'Meles Cup' and the Women Premier League has changed its name to 'Ethio-Woman 
Premier League Meles Cup'.  
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Entrance to the national stadium, Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
Sport and sport events are thus connected directly to the regimes policy; developmentalism, as 
well as to the legacy of the former prime minister.  
 
Hyping sport is not unusual for authoritarian regimes. In order for the state to ‘broadcast’ itself 
with a positive image to the world promoting sport has been a popular tactic in states such as 
North Korea and the Soviet Union (Koch, 2013). Sport events represents a positive side of the 
nation and it is a suitable tool to promote a forward looking image of a regime that aims to 
overcome backwardness by achieving development. As noted above 'developmental regimes' tend 
to foster a set of 'positive strategies' in order to frame rule as being successful (Koch, 2013:43). 
Sport thus helps to create a positive atmosphere and at the same time the population is again 
mobilised in a way that creates the feeling of actual participation. Additionally, sport events serve 
as an arena to perform patriotism that undeniably supports the leadership (Koch, 2013).  
 
 
6.2 Meles neither for peace nor for unity  
Interviews revealed a slightly different picture of Meles Zenawi than the official presentation of 
Meles as 'father of peace' or 'national hero'. In sharp contrast to the messages in the propaganda a 
woman stated that 'most people said and felt that Meles never had any national feeling.'
52
 A male 
interviewee emphasised the army's strong presence throughout the country and highlighted that 
the former leader did not in reality promote rights, nor did he promote peace. Rather he used the 
system to keep his grip on power.
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 Another interviewee explained that Meles Zenawi was a key 
actor dividing and sabotaging the collaboration between Christians and Muslims. His rule did not 
promote religious peace, rather it created a gap between the religious groups.
54
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As noted the identity of the state remains closely attached to the history of the Ethiopian 
highlands and the propaganda refers occasionally to the story of the Axumite Kingdom. Some 
informants complained about this narrative and about being forced to understand their past in a 
specific way. For example an informant stated: 'It is always about the Abyssinians. And the 
Church. We are bombarded with propaganda.'
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 Another informant, an Amhara/Oromo 
Protestant, expressed his discomfort this way; 'EPRDF are trying to change the history of 
Ethiopia. All regimes in Ethiopia are trying to change the history to benefit them. Personally, I do 
not want to be included in this story.''
56
 A Muslim woman revealed her opinion: 'We do not feel 
like a part of Ethiopian history, it is repeated everywhere that Ethiopia is a Christian country. 
Half of the population hears this and they are not a part of that. (...) It is all about the Orthodox 
and how they rose and came to politics.'
57
 
 
However, despite the criticism informants emphasised that through the establishment of the 
ethnic based system, Meles Zenawi, compared to previous rulers, had been more tolerant towards 
ethnicities allowing citizens the right to express their religion and speak their own language. 
 
Informants criticised the rising propaganda in public space and some informants underlined that 
people had been forced to participate in national rallies, celebrations and in the ceremonies 
commemorating the former prime minister. For example, one interviewee explained how the 
kebele structure had served as a tool to mobilise the people making sure that citizens established 
and attended candle light ceremonies and poetry readings for the death leader.
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6.3 Appropriating the glories past in times of crisis 
National symbolism in Ethiopia has evolved since the post-1991 government took over. As 
explained in this chapter the 2001 crisis and the 2005 election were critical moments for the 
regime and in the aftermath new national traditions were invented serving the interest of a regime 
that aims to control how national identity should be defined and understood. Today, in the 
absence of the long serving strongman, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, these traditions are 
dedicated and celebrated in memorial of him. Not only are success stories, traditions and national 
days now related directly to the former leader; hospitals and schools are named after him and the 
first monument of the leader was erected in Jigjiga in April 2012.  
As the creator of the federalist system Meles is framed as the protector of all ethnicities. And 
every Ethiopian has to appreciate Meles, because he is also representing the state. Questioning 
Meles means questioning the entire system and the state. 
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 Interview female interviewee, 15 December 2012, Addis Ababa 
58
 Interview intellectual, 21 November 2012, Addis Ababa 
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The state-building mechanisms during the imperial era were rooted in religion and divine rule 
related to the ancient story of the past. The emperors, Emperor Haile Selassie being the last, were 
prime promoters of the Greater Ethiopia image and Haile Selassie was closely connected to the 
Church and the legacy from the Christian highland (Sählstrom, 1990:11).  
Breaking with the past, the Derg had to create a feeling of unity in Ethiopia based on something 
else than monarchy and religion. The military regime turned to Marxism and looked towards 
Soviet, however, before too long the Derg also started appropriating the old narrative of the past. 
When Mengistu faced a crisis, threatened by the Somali invasion and various separatist 
movements, he consolidated his role as a dictator and turned to the glorious past although mainly 
emphasising a 'secular' version of the tradition (Donham,1999). Nonetheless, he began to 
appropriate the same national symbols as the emperors and the Church was increasingly seen in 
state rituals (Donham,1999:142). 
 
When Meles Zenawi came to power he had to renew this discourse and build nationalism on 
something new. From 1991 efforts to sustain the state as a unit have been made through the 
establishment of a decentralized ethnic based system (Young, 1997:209). In the official narrative 
of the past Meles Zenawi and the TPLF fought the Derg and liberated Ethiopia's nations and 
nationalities within the new state project (Hagmann&Abbink, 2012:583) Originally unity of the 
state was, however, not in the centre of the TPLF. It was of secondary importance for the 
movement during their formation process. Their manifesto from 1976, though later rejected, 
revealed that the first task after taking power would be to establish an independent Tigray 
(Young, 1997:99). Initially this was the primary objective, however, it was later rejected in favour 
of a focus on national unity through decentralisation seemingly the best tactic.  
 
As stated above a pan-national discourse is now equalised or sometimes favoured within the 
framework of ethnic federalism. An example is the propaganda developed both before and after 
Meles' death focusing on Ethiopian unity and pride. This sometimes nears the patriotic 'Ethiopia 
first' propaganda of Mengistu that reflected the political programme aiming to make people adapt 
their individual and/or ethnic identity in favour of nationalism (Donham, 1999).  
 
In times of crisis it seems that leaders turn to state centralisation and to the dominant narrative of 
the past. Although the country has changed significantly since the fall of imperial rule, the 
common understanding of the past and the traditional story of the nation remains the same 
(Clapham, 2002). However, as much as the state tries to encapsulate all groups within this 
national narrative, as much it might repulse and marginalise people (Clapham, 2002:41; Toggia, 
2008). 
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7. Meles – the Person                                                                    
This section examines the framing and presentation of Meles Zenawi as a person. In public space 
people are not only saturated with the achievements of the former leader they are also exposed to 
propaganda that lauds his great personal skills. With the help of interviews this chapter examines 
how he is presented, framed and made exceptional in public space, how the image of him has 
changed over time and how it is made adaptable in order for everyone to be able to relate to. 
Counter narratives reveal other opinions about the former leader - opinions that are critical 
towards the propaganda. Lastly, the framing of Meles Zenawi will be compared to the framing of 
the former leaders. 
 
7.1 An outstanding person 
Meles was presented as a visionary intellectual, a man who was always working for knowledge 
and for the best idea regardless of the subject. Several informants explained that Meles had an 
exceptional mind; he studied hard, he was a great thinker and wrote many books. According to a 
male interviewee 'Meles was a miraculous person.'
59
 His natural gifted intellect combined with 
an endless search for knowledge made him an exceptional leader. In the words of a dedicated 
businessman: 'Mr Zenawi was naturally gifted. He was intelligent, naturally intelligent and self-
made. He worked hard and always for knowledge. When those two are combined it makes a 
genius.'60  
Most informants acknowledged Meles for his great and outstanding rhetorical skills. Several 
times I was told that the former leader could convince anybody. He knew how to address the 
parliament and when he was present everyone would listen. A student explained: 'By logic he 
could convince everybody, both Ethiopians and people from other countries.'61 
 
Meles had the ability to make smart and strategic decisions at crucial moments, which is a pivotal 
quality when holding power. Whatever the challenge might be Meles was a steady leader 
sacrificing himself because 'he was never afraid to lead.'
62
 A government official stated that 
Meles was the smartest of all leaders in Ethiopian history and who in comparison 'where all 
dictators.'
63 
Compared to former rulers Meles Zenawi was special and according to a student 'He 
did not negotiate. To maximize the benefit for Ethiopia was his goal, the old government, under 
Mengistu, was always compromising, but Meles was steady, first for Ethiopia then for Africa.'64 
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On a continent of corrupt and selfish state rulers Meles was framed as an unselfish and simple 
leader. Despite his powerful position he was able to refrain from a luxurious lifestyle and he did 
not care about personal comfort or fame. To illustrate a Harari businessman explained: 'He was 
not a rich man. There were no security at his funeral. The way he was living was very simple. He 
was a simple man. When he died the daughter opened the house. She wanted everyone to see that 
he was not how people thought he was.'65 
 
Meles' residence was opened and broadcasted on TV and a party-member explained that this 
raised great public support as 'every Ethiopian started to like him from that moment, after they 
saw how he was living.'66 Furthermore, informants emphasised how important this signal was to 
other African leaders; self-absorbed and with their hands full of corruption. In the words of a 
government official Meles Zenawi was 'a role model on the continent because he did not allow 
any kind of corruption.'
67 
Informants emphasised that because of Meles corruption was an 
unknown phenomenon in Ethiopia.68 
 
Many interviewees stated that Meles would not have approved of the ongoing worshipping of his 
person as he was against any kind of personal adoration. His widow, Azeb Mesfin, openly called 
for the cease of the worshipping of her husband. Had he been alive he would not allow his image 
to loom up everywhere. Several informants pointed out this anecdote, arguing that his wife was 
right; had Meles been alive he would not be comfortable with what he saw. 
 
According to a businessman, who previously worked as a high level government official, Meles 
was a leader 'who gave his people a possibility to evolve.'
69 
Another businessman highlighted that 
as a man of his people Meles listened to his people, for example at various business forums.
70
 He 
gave rights to nationalities in Ethiopia so he was pluralistic
71 
and when visiting the different 
regions of the country he was always respected the various nationalities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65
 Interview businessman,  23. November 2012, Addis Ababa 
66
 Interview young party-member, 15 November 2012, Addis Ababa 
67
 Interview government official, 27 November 2012,Addis Ababa 
68
 Interview media employee, 2 December 2012 / Businessman 29 November / Businessman, 23 November 2012 
69
 Interview businessman, 23 November 2012, Addis Ababa 
70
 Interview businessman, 29 November 2012, Addis Ababa 
71
 Interview media employee, 2. December 2012 
57 
7.1.1 A Meles for everyone 
Especially since 2005 the system developed under the rule of Meles Zenawi has aimed to 
mobilize a wide range of social groups including groups that are usually considered to have 
contradicting material interest, for example civil servants and merchants, peasants and 
businessmen (Jones, 2013:8). In contemporary public space Meles appears on different occasions 
with different segments of society; Meles with children, women, youth, farmers, diplomats, 
different nationalities and soldiers. 
 
Meskel Square, Addis Ababa 
 
During my fieldwork it became clear that the current cult of Meles is made mobile and 
constructed in a way that makes it easy for all citizens to relate to and individualize. People can 
select that aspect of the narrative about Meles which suit their own idea about his leadership and 
which represent their segment or stand in society. The narrative of Meles is made easy for 
everyone to relate to; young/old, man/woman, rich/poor.  
 
For example, referring to the billboards of Meles Zenawi in the streets, a young taxi-driver in 
Addis Ababa explained that now life was changing. With the youth brought into focus he had 
possibilities.
72
 Additionally, a young businesswoman pointed out that the economy in Ethiopia 
was now absorbing the youth: 'Now things are changing. The mentality of the youth is changing. 
There are hope and people are committed now. He is giving young people an opportunity'.73  
 
On another occasion with a group of women engaged in the micro and small enterprise sector, 
one informant connected the memory of Meles to the aspect of women's rights when she 
elaborated: 'All of the visions of our leader are achieved when we have our rights. All is 
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changing. This is his era and his visions.'74 
 
 
Above: 'A leader who struggle for women's and youth's participation and for their benefits and also for children's rights and 
security. Below: We promise to sustain the journey of the Renaissance'.  
Qabana, Addis Ababa, December 2012. Sponsored by Addis Ababa Women/Youth/Children's Affairs Offices  
 
Meles' legacy is likewise adaptable to the diverse ethnic and religious environment in Ethiopia. 
During the official mourning period mourning ceremonies were adapted to different traditions in 
the different regions of Ethiopia took place. The different nationalities could form the mourning 
of Meles in terms of their customs. According to a Harari businessman 'people claimed that 
Meles was a Christian, a Muslim and so on because everybody wanted Meles to have their 
religion.'
75
  
 
An employee from a local media station emphasized that Meles had transformed the country 
giving rights to all nationalities including his own; 'Before Meles there was a very hard 
dictatorship (...) Meles gave us a change. Before Meles there were no opportunities.''76  
In the different regions of Ethiopia billboards and posters with Meles Zenawi's political 
statements are in different languages adapting to the diverse environment of the country. 
 
Informants from the business segment emphasised Meles' ambitions to introduce market 
economy. Naturally, a market economy adapted to Ethiopia after Meles' vision as 'Meles had the 
interest and knowledge in all areas of good business in Ethiopia.''
77
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As a part of Meles' vision for Ethiopia he created good opportunities for businesses and another 
businessman, who had recently left a government position in favour of a job in an emerging and 
expanding sector stated 'we will export according to the vision of Meles.'
78
 
 
 
To the left: 'Meles was a leader who worked hard for the change of our city and its people'. To the right: 'Son of the people, a 
great leader who worked for the nations, nationalities and people's of Ethiopia's rights, equality and developments'  
Billboards of Meles Zenawi sponsored by private companies, Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
7.1.2 Shifting image: from separatist to nationalist, from Marxist to capitalist 
Meles Zenawi's personal appearance underwent some changes from his day in the bush as a  
revolutionary separatist. The image of his person was modified along with changes in the 
regime's ideology as the focus on capitalism and economic development no longer demanded him 
to be a revolutionary icon. In recent years he appeared as a suit-wearing high level diplomat; a 
strong leader who could act in international diplomacy. The images below illustrate the shift in 
appearance; from Marxist to capitalist/from separatist to nationalist. 
 
 
Meles Zenawi Exhibition, Meskel Square, Addis Ababa, November 2012 
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7.1.3 Meles - the hero  
After his death Meles Zenawi is presented as a hero, for example he is referred to as a hero 
fighter, a revolutionary hero or a hero of development.  
 
 
'A hero will not die. You worked hard and your dream will come true by your children' 
Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
The direction of Meles' legacy, the immortalisation of him and the hero-worship of his 
personality was indicated long before his death The power concentration around his person took 
shape after the 2001 crisis and at the 2010 election the image of him was cemented suggesting a 
clear direction in the narrative. According to a female interviewee Meles Zenawi himself was a 
key actor in producing the image of him being a larger-than-life hero elevated from people, party 
and government: 'He made this feeling. He was a strong leader. People had faith in him, not in 
the party, not in the government. He created this feeling to show that he was the only one. Like 
God. People where believing that he was the only on.'
79
 
 
Although the propaganda in public space does not refer to Meles as an actual God or as a leader 
with supernatural power per se, it gives the impression of him being a mythical or an outstanding 
human being, it makes him exceptional and the metaphors makes the narrative about him more 
powerful. Ethiopian media and state TV played a special role in the process of cultivating the cult 
and producing the image of the leader. The constant propaganda placed the prime minister above 
all and everything. According to a journalist from E-TV: 'The media sensationalized everything 
he did. The media made people feel that he was the only one who would ever achieve. When he 
died, everybody was mourning. The party made the people gather again.'
80
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'A fighter will die, but fight will not die, a hero will not die' 
Dire Dawa, December 2012 
 
As explained in previous chapters there is a deliberate attempt to mix symbols of history and 
religion with contemporary political values in the official narrative about Meles Zenawi. The 
hero-worship of his personality places Meles Zenawi in the Greater Tradition narrative; a cult 
seeks to form a common identity with the glorious past in search of legitimacy and in order to 
establish an emotional bond with the people. An interviewee explained the purpose of the 'hero 
rhetoric' about Meles: 'Calling him a hero is about claiming legitimacy through Solomon, 
referring to a mandate from heaven, the election of God. All this is a tool to legitimate the regime. 
This picture of him fits perfectly into Ethiopian history. Haile Selassie was a kind of a semi-God 
and not pictured as a human being. But even the past is more modest. With this leader it is more 
extreme.'
81
 
The official narrative about Meles Zenawi thus presents a picture of him that fits perfectly into 
the history of Ethiopian rulers and continues a certain tradition of leadership among the rulers in 
the country (Toggia, 2008; Clapham, 1988;79). 
 
In this regard it also becomes relevant to include the concept of hagiography, moreover the 
Christian Ethiopian concept of cults of the saints. Hagiography concerns writings that celebrate 
the life, death and miracles of a saint. This kind of writing constitute an extensive genre in 
Ethiopian literature from the Middle Ages reflecting also the history and culture of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church (Mecca, 2006). This tradition of cult of saints should not be examined as an 
isolated phenomenon, but has to be seen within the context of the society and the structure of the 
Church from where the tradition derived (Kaplan, 1984). Writers, the hagiographers, tried to 
present the story of the saint as interesting as possible. Often this would reveal more about the 
religious world and traditional customs than the actual life of the saint. Hagiography was thus not 
a biography about the person (Kaplan,1984:9; Mecca, 2006).  
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Hagiographers were not historians; their main goal was to glorify the memory of the saint in 
order to, for example, win over new followers to the cult of the saint. Therefore hagiographies are 
full of exaggerations referring to Christianity, to the Bible and to other saints or legends (Mecca, 
2006). 
In order to understand the Christian Ethiopian concept of saints it is important to emphasize that 
the saints, as they were pictured in the old texts, were not preachers of morality or protectors of 
mankind as such, but rather a saint was a powerful patron celebrated for being a protector of 
those who were devoted to him. In other words, he was celebrated because of the favouritism that 
was offered to those who followed him. The relationship between saint and followers thus also 
reflected a patron-client relation (Kaplan, 1984;11).  
 
Informants explained that the tradition of hero-worshipping, although under different terms, was 
still present an integrated in society. Remarkable personalities, for example athletes, could 
achieve the 'hero status'. Referring to the rhetoric surrounding Meles' legacy a female interviewee 
explained that 'Ethiopian's love their leaders. We love heroes.'
82
  
 
Although the direction of Meles' legacy was indicated before his death the idolisation of him 
exploded when his death was announced and the funeral took place. At the time his coffin came 
to Addis Ababa the atmosphere was intense as  people gathered at massive public mourning.  
Given the political context it is hard to tell who were genuinely mourning Meles' death. In an 
authoritarian state characterised by strongman rule national rituals function as a way to mobilise 
the people and participation becomes the obligation of the citizens (Jovic, 2004). As noted the 
woreda and the kebele structure served as tools in order to structure the mourning participation 
and it mobilised citizens throughout the country.
83
 
Additionally, public morning in a totalitarian context is not a new phenomenon. Huge public 
funerals were arranged to laud the communist leaders such as Mao and Kim Jong-il and people 
were directly or indirectly forced to worship and cry for the death leader.  
 
Image of Meles Zenawi in showcase, Addis Ababa, December 2012 
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However, the public mourning seen at Meles' funeral also relates to mourning traditions of the 
Ethiopian highlands, where Meles himself came from, more precisely Tigray. Weeping, self pain 
and jumping up and dropping down are parts of a Tigray mourning tradition performed in order 
to show grief (Tesemma, 1956:15). There is little difference between private and public 
mourning; rather it is the norm to mourn and cry together (Walker, 1933:61). Mourning rituals 
can consist of songs, poetry readings and chanting through which the dead person is praised and 
lauded. It is a norm to point out the greatness, deeds and accomplishments of the death person 
throughout the commemoration period which can last a week, two weeks or more (Tesemma, 
1956:18; Walker, 1933).  
 
However, the cult of Meles Zenawi, initiated before his death and massive in his aftermath is 
much more systematic and deliberate and should not be defined simply as a result of a mourning 
phenomenon in the aftermath of his death. 
 
 
'Even though you are not alive we still love you' 
Postcard sold in the streets. Addis Ababa, December 2012 
 
 
 
7.1.4 The people as the protectors   
An important part of Meles' philosophy and doctrine was to ensure that revolutionary democracy 
became firmly grasped by the party and not least the people (Bach, 2012). Moreover the aim of 
the EPRDF is to mobilize the people through public participation and through the creation of 
public ownership forming a 'coalition with the people' (Vaughan, 2011). 
 
In accordance with the doctrine it appears that people must now, after Meles death, function as 
the protectors and guarantors of Meles' vision and party members and cadres play a crucial part in 
this process. This is exemplified with the case of a 27- year-old student. The student grew up in 
64 
Eastern Ethiopia and earlier in his life he was not active in his community, because as he said 
'before, no one cared about people like me.'
84
 No attention was paid to the youth until women and 
youth politics were implemented after the 2005 election. In 2007 his Kebele community asked 
him in an 'informal and formal way' to participate in a political campaign. He was asked to raise 
the subject of youth rights including; for instance access to libraries, and he decided to get 
engaged and become active as 'it would be wise to use the government power to participate'.  
He arranged several youth meetings and workshops e.g. about inclusiveness and the Ethiopian 
constitution and after the campaign he was elected to the regional parliament while also serving 
as a civil servant. Becoming active was a turning point in his life because awareness has given 
the people an opportunity to develop. This was associated with the former Prime Minister; 
'People see the light, it is people’s participation, starting from leader Meles' administration. He 
started the initiative, when people see the light, "glimpse of light" they embrace it'.  
Today, although the Prime Minister is gone 'his strategy will live and it will be made into people’s 
vision' because 'people are in their own renaissance now'.  According to the student, it is the 
people who are in charge and their role from now on will be to protect and watch those who 
implement Meles' strategy as government officials might corrupt and distort his ideas.
85
 
 
This exemplifies how the system aims to engage the people. Meles Zenawi knew that he would 
only succeed if the development discourse became people's own ambitions; it had to become an 
internalized set of assumptions not to be imposed through direct order. In other words the aim 
was to create a common mindset in people's heads and for this purpose the recruitment of 
'vanguard members' is essential (de Wall, 2012; Bach, 2012). 
 
The case also exemplifies how the current personality cult works in order to establish a bond with 
the people. Meles Zenawi is not only the protector of the people - the people are also the 
protectors of him. This reveals the dialectic between leader and followers; the cult is shaped so 
that the masses perceive the leader as belonging to them (Rees, 2004:22). 
 
 
7.2 An unpopular autocrat  
In sharp contrast with the dominant narrative Meles Zenawi is described as a leader who, 
regardless of the method, would do anything to stay in power. A woman criticised the system 
established by Meles Zenawi stating that 'Meles destroyed everything so that nothing would be 
better than his system.'
86
 
Meles Zenawi ruled alone. He was not a democrat, but a ruler who had no tolerance for 
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opponents and who 'never took advise or listened to others.'
87
 Indeed, Meles Zenawi was 
intelligent and extremely talented in terms of manipulation. Referring to the transition period a 
political adviser explained that 'it was known that the new prime minister would not have the 
same abilities. Meles outsmarted all other leaders.'88  
Another interviewee pointed out that he had a double personality; one towards his own 
population, who he did not really care about, and one towards the international community, who 
he would do anything to impress.
89
  
 
The political environment in Ethiopia complicates open political discussions, but when in private  
people express their criticism and joke about the propaganda. For example, a woman explained: 
'We are joking about the mass propaganda about Meles now. It is a general feeling that you are 
tired of this now (...) You should see E-news, in the middle of the news they will suddenly show his 
opinion on this and that topic. About everything. We are now laughing at this. It shows that they 
are hiding behind him.'
90
   
Several interviewees expressed discomfort about the party's strategy to abuse the legacy of the 
former leader. It was regarded as a sign of weakness that the government had to spend so much 
time on the former leader.
91
 A woman, tired of the worshipping of Meles personality, explained: 
'What are they trying to say with the pictures? That people believes in him, worship him? But it is 
not true. They are trying to say that he is the best thing that ever happened to this country. It is 
not the reality. It is a disguise. It is not the will of the people.'
92
 
 
Meles Zenawi and the TPLF leadership are famous for their obsession with secrecy (ICG,2009). 
In contrast to the official narrative, that relates his secrecy to modesty, an interviewee explained: 
'Meles was always very quiet about himself as a person. He knew that if he were more open 
everybody would loose their faith in him, because he is Tigray, and it would all be about ethnicity 
if he was more open about it. People would get tired of him very fast. He knew this very well, that 
is why he was so quite about himself.''
93
 
 
Additionally, Meles might not have been a typical autocrat with a luxurious lifestyle and 
expensive cars, but he knew how to reward loyalists and family members, including his own wife 
who plays an influential role in the private sector.
94
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7.3 Framing Meles, Mengistu and Haile Selassie 
This chapter described the construction of the narrative about Meles Zenawi focusing on his  
person. Although he is not referred to as an actual 'God' the presentation of him in public space 
makes him exceptional and helps to immortalise him. 
The presentation of Meles post mortem draws on a communist way of celebrating leaders as well 
as a leadership tradition grounded in Ethiopia, specifically grounded in the Ethiopian highlands. 
In Soviet the communist propaganda presented leaders as fathers of their nation and the leaders 
personified the party's ideology as well as the state (Gill, 1980). Like the Soviet leaders, Meles 
Zenawi was a key actor in building up his own cult, and similar to the cult of Stalin success 
stories in contemporary Ethiopia is pictured as stemming directly from Meles' wise decision-
making. However, as well as the cult of Lenin, Meles' cult was primarily activated post-mortem 
by the Party who needed the legacy to maintain their rule. Meles is now an integrated part of the 
party's rhetoric and aim for legitimation. Upon Lenin's death a committee was established to 
make sure of the 'immortalisation' of his legacy (Rees,2004). Same tendencies are seen in 
contemporary Ethiopia.  
 
Personified power and cults of personalities are not new phenomenas in Ethiopia. Meles' cult 
shares similarities with the cult of his predecessor, Mengistu Hailemariam, who build his own 
cult inspired also by a Soviet tradition (Donham, 1999). Posters, pictures and huge portraits of 
Mengistu were erected on government buildings, in front of party headquarters and at 
Revolutionary Square (now Meskel Square) framing him as a national hero and as the one 
leading Ethiopia towards a glorious  and modern future (Sählstrøm, 1990:127; Clapham, 1988, 
79). Additionally, images of Lenin and Marx affixed to bridges and other structures along roads 
could be seen throughout Ethiopia during the rule of the Derg (Niederstadt and Klemm, 2009:9). 
  
 
Mengistu Hailemariam painted by North Korean artists,  
Meskel Square (Revolutionary Square), Addis Ababa, Photo: Berit Sählstrøm,1984 (Sählstrøm,1990) 
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During his rule Mengistu also made changes in his image and his appearance. Initially pictures 
showed Mengistu in a military uniform, but later on this was replaced by pictures of him in 
civilian clothes (Sählstrom, 1990:127). Both Mengistu and Meles followed a tradition related to 
the emperors, a tradition of authority always having to be personal, powerful and exercised from 
above and from a distance (Donham, 1999:148).  
Emperor Haile Selassie was pictured as a patriarch often in a manner that gave associations to the 
Holy Trinity. Images associated him to a heroic and saintly figure, for example it seemed like he 
replaced Jesus blessing the children (Sählstrom, 1990:127). Furthermore, Haile Selassie also 
appeared in a business-like style related to his international and moderniser ambitions. 
 
Throughout his rule Mengistu began to look more and more like the emperors. During the first 
years of Mengistu's rule pictures of him reflected a socialist imagery, however, later pictures with 
themes closely related to the traditional style of the emperors were produced (Sählstrom, 
1990:127, Donham, 1999; Clapham, 1988:79). Moreover, Mengistu appeared in public space 
sitting on a throne seemingly copying the style of Haile Selassie (Donham, 1999:146). 
The framing of Meles Zenawi (before his death and post mortem) increasingly turned to some of 
the same practises of both Haile Selassie and Mengistu had used; picturing himself as exceptional 
and raised above others in the establishment of a cult of personality. Meles, however, did not live 
in great luxury like his predecessors who both enjoyed a traditional autocratic lifestyle (Clapham, 
1988:80; deWall, 2012:3). Moreover, Meles seemed to be more cautious not to be directly 
personally or politically associated with Christianity or the Church than his predecessors.  
 
Although the current regime established by Meles Zenawi has monopoly on public space, people 
are not prevented from complaining and joking about the constant propaganda and the far-
reaching cult in private.  
During the rule of Mengistu jokes and criticism that ridiculed him, the party and their 
development policies also evolved. In his work about oral literature Fekade Azeze (2002) 
investigates people's jokes and criticism, revealing that people made fun of the irrational policies 
and the power-craving leader. Fekade demonstrates that the peasants did not cheer for their leader 
because of respect or a genuine commitment, but because they feared the repressive system of 
power. While expressing their views on politics in private through jokes that ridiculed Mengistu, 
the peasants publicly obeyed the regime (Azeze, 2002:155).  
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8. Conclusion                                         
 
When Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died in August 2012 it started a process of hagiography; he 
was publicly lauded and praised, pictured as a Great Leader and compared to an immortal hero. 
A certain narrative about his personality and leadership was endlessly repeated reflecting a 
discourse that was not entirely new, but which developed and magnified a narrative already 
constructed before his death. Meles Zenawi himself built a system of power concentrated around 
his person and progressively through his ruling period he became more and more elevated. The 
direction of his legacy was thus indicated long before he died, but the idolisation and 
worshipping of his personality escalated after his death.  
 
This thesis examined narratives about Meles Zenawi collected ultimo 2012, approximately three 
months after his death. It thus reflects different opinions towards his leadership; opinions that 
overlap, support or oppose the official narrative.  
There is no question that many people benefited from Meles' policy and for whom it is in their 
material interest to continue Meles' path. Moreover, many still admire him. However, narratives 
also reveal that he was an unpopular leader. Given the political context, loyalty to the official 
narrative and public lauding is closely related to the dominant party structure, to a system of 
cohesion and manipulation and related to fear.  
 
To maintain power the ruling elite promotes a system of control where the regime infiltrates all 
spheres of society; it controls politics, economy, media and public space. If we turn to Rees 
(2004) who argues that a cult of personality reflects the condition of a political system in a given 
society then that is not encouraging for Ethiopia. The cult reflects to what extend power has been 
personified, how regulated political debate is, how controlled the media is and lastly, it indicates 
how much control a regime has on socialisation processes in the society. The latter is of great 
importance as the system established by Meles seems to be very effective in mobilising and 
shaping loyal citizens, cadres and party-members. Furthermore, the current cult works to 
establish and strengthen the bond between leadership and followers, a dialectic bond that aims to 
make people embrace the leader as belonging to them. Post mortem Meles Zenawi is not just the 
protector of the people – the people are also the protectors of him and his vision. 
 
The propaganda in public space that narrates the life, deeds and political ambitions of Meles 
Zenawi is state sponsored, controlled and produced through the government's channels of 
communication; through media, ministries and through the administration. The private sector 
also contributes to the establishment of the leader cult.  
 
The question becomes why the ruling elite or the ruling Party established a cult of personality 
after the Prime Minister's death? Why is the narrative about him politically relevant?  
One explanation is that in the absence of strongman rule the ruling elite has cultivated a cult to 
legitimise their continued existence trying to convince, persuade or manipulate people to believe 
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that Meles was the best leader, and that his vision should thus be implemented by those who see 
themselves as best able to lead Ethiopia on Meles' path.  
Perhaps, one could say that the Party is hiding behind Meles' image. Historically speaking this is 
not a new phenomenon; In Soviet and China cults have allowed remaining elites to mobilize the 
masses around a unifying symbol and through the cult maintained a degree of personalised 
power. A power structure which they had relied so heavily upon before the death of the 
strongman. However, first and foremost the cult of Meles and its implicit system of symbolism is 
an effective way for the remaining leadership to visualise its dominance on society. The cult 
aims to illustrate and exercise power, indoctrinate people and shape public opinion thus serving 
as a tool to depoliticise public space. Moreover, the cult is one mechanism out of many for the 
regime to maintain power and dominance. 
 
The cult of Meles is not static and presents different images of him. Meles is for youth, women, 
children, businessmen, civil servants, nationalities, pastoralists, soldiers and unemployed. The 
image of him is constructed and presented in ways that aims to make it easy for everyone to 
identify themselves with the leader. The exhibition about Meles Zenawi in Meskel Square in the 
capital of the country demonstrates that the former leader was and is everything; Meles is a 
revolutionary, Meles is a patriot, Meles is a statesman and a diplomat, Meles is a writer, Meles is 
an intellectual, Meles is the father of peace, Meles is an inspirer, Meles is a hero, Meles is for 
development, Meles is a businessman, Meles is a protector of the poor and so on and so on.  
Furthermore, Meles' cult contains different and sometimes contrasting aspects; anti-imperialism, 
marxism, capitalism, democracy, freedom fight, peace, stability, African pride, equality, self-
determination, diversity, unity, good governance, development, growth, glorious past and 
modern future. In many ways the narrative about Meles is adaptable and mobile continuing a 
style of blurred and flexible practises and policies that also characterised Meles while alive. 
Since 1991 ideology, policy, rhetoric and personal framing have thus continued to evolve 
depending on time, situation and sometimes audience. 
 
The thesis focuses on aspects of the official narrative of Meles Zenawi that concerns 
developmentalism and national definition; key issues for the current ruling elite. The official 
narrative draws not only on domestic discourses, it also uses international sources. For example 
the renaissance rhetoric was initially formulated by former President Bill Clinton, the 'Yes We 
Can' rhetoric copies President Obama and Meles' rhetoric to 'end poverty' is similar to the British 
development aid campaign aiming to 'make poverty history'. The official narrative thus relates 
to, incorporates and reproduces international discourses and not least international expectations. 
 
Furthermore, the cult and its implicit symbolism reflects a pan-national discourse initiated by 
Meles Zenawi when he claimed that this era represented a unique period of time between the 
glorious past and the modern future. This discourse is firmly reproduced after his death.  
Post mortem Meles Zenawi represents the past, the present and the future for Ethiopia 
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consolidating that there is only one way; Meles' way. The message in public space is clear; 
Meles is above all. He is above the people, the party and above criticism.  
National days, events, buildings and success stories are connected directly to the former leader 
commemorating and celebrating his legacy. He does not only personify the ideology and the 
current policy, he also embodies the state. The national symbolism in the propaganda works to 
generate dominance and to provide people with a generalised system of orientation towards state, 
nation and national identity.  
 
In the line of Ethiopian rulers the former Prime Minister represents another autocrat. Like 
Mengistu, Meles rose from a phase of collective leadership eventually cementing his role on top. 
Both leaders established a system of absolute power and both were obsessed with control. 
Undeniably, the two rulers differ in many ways, but both of them gradually began to appropriate 
some of the same practises as the emperors.  
Meles and the EPRDF reshaped Ethiopia politically and economically and created the unique 
system of ethnic federalism. However, the centre of the state have from the beginning been 
dominant within this framework and the government has continuously centralised power turning 
the decentralised system into more of a divide and rule tactic. The way Ethiopia has evolved 
since Meles took over in 1991 thus supports the idea of continuity rather than discontinuity with 
the past. The propaganda in public space plays on some of the same pillars of legitimacy that 
former regimes have relied upon; developmentalism, embodied by a strong 'moderniser' and an 
emphasis on national unity referring to the glorious past, fixed on the civilisation of Axum.  
 
The transition after Meles' death tested the ability of the leadership to compromise and negotiate. 
Historically speaking party-based regimes appears to be the strongest when facing a challenge 
such as leadership succession. Rather than initiate a power struggle upon Meles death, the 
fractions within the Party collaborated, and so far no example of a critical struggle among the 
elite has been seen in public. It was Meles' wish to be succeeded by the devoted and loyal 
technocrat Hailemariam Desalegn who now chairs both the EPRDF and holds the post of prime 
minister. He inherited a centralised system with a remarkable infrastructure which ensures that 
control remains at the centre.  
The current leadership and power structure (more consensus oriented) is certainly different from 
the period when decision-making was performed by a single person. However, the current cult 
allows 'business as usual' and for the time being it seems the vision of the Great Leader remains 
unchallenged.  
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